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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 
three, Article eight of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated 
78-2-2(3)(a). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Claimant, Douglas K. Butler, applied for and was denied unemployment 
compensation following the termination of his employment with the employer, 
Petitioner, The United States Air Force, His claim was then heard by an 
Administrative Law Judge who reversed the Department's prior determination. 
The employer appealed to the Board of Review who sustained the Administrative 
Law Judge. The employer filed a petition for review. 
The ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and the decision of the Board 
of Review have been reproduced as attachments A and B respectively and are 
included in the back of this brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the decision of the Board of Review contrary to the facts in 
the record? 
2. Were the regulations which were applied reasonable and did they 
subserve the statute they were created to enforce? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This case turns on the following law, reproduced as attachments, and 
included in the back of this brief. 
Attachment C: Executive Order 12584 
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Attachment D: Utah Code Annotated 35-4-5 
Attachment E: Industrial Commission Rules 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Douglas K. Butlers employment with the United States Air Force was 
terminated when he resigned on September 19, 1988, see record at 5, 12, 
13, 15, 16, 26-29, 31, 37, 46, 56. He applied for unemployment insurance 
benefits which were denied in a decision dated October 27th, 1988, see record 
at 34. A hearing was held on his appeal on November 21st, 1988, see record 
at 34. The administrative law judge reversed the prior determination and 
awarded Mr. Butler benefits in an order dated November 23, 1988. That 
decision was upheld by the Board of Review in its decision dated January 31, 
1989. 
Mr. Butler was employed by the Air Force from January 1, 1982 to 
September 25, 1988, see record at 38. At the time of his termination he was 
an "Aircraft worker, wage grade 8", making $11.66 per hour, see record at 38. 
He was required to have a secret security clearance for his work, see record 
at 38, 39. 
An investigation conducted by the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations, Mr. Butler sold cocaine to an undercover Air Force employee, 
see record at 39, 52, 55, 56. When questioned in connection with the 
investigation at the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Mr. Butler 
admitted the sale, see record at 10, 39, 43, 44, 52, 55, 56. Mr. Butler was 
not arrested because he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials in 
2 
the on igoing investigation. see record at 51, 52 Ii » conjunction with the 
same incident which led to Mr, Bi it ler s termination three other Air Force 
employees were terminated, one iom was an associate and coworker r 
Butler, see record at 41, 53, 54 
A f t. f • i e c: e i v e d i i o t i c e o I " f 111 B i 11 1 e i • s ii i i o I v e in e n t i i it II: I i e s a 1 e o f 
dn igr ,. a ..>, --as i e fen 'ed to 1:1 le :\ ii i I  " o i x e Secur i t y C I ear ance Off i ce i n 
Washington, D.C t o de t e rmine whether oi " i lot I i is seci i r i t y c l e a r a n c e woi ild be 
p e i % m a n e n 1: II,; ' r e'' r o k e d s e e r e c o i d a t 15 I 11 B i i t I e r s e m p I o,; m e r 11: r i g t 11: s a i e 
protected and governed by tl le Mer i t: Systems Protection Board who determines 
whether he may i "eta iii i h i s employment r e g a r d l e s s of a conv ict i ion for til le s a l e 
o Il ' ::  o c a i i i e s e e n e c o i ::l a II: 15 19 5 0 Il Il i B t i t Il EI I Il m a d o p 1: e d i i o 1: II: o e : c e i ::: i s e 
In i s M S P.B. appea ! r igh t s as o f tl i 3 t ime o f the hear ing, see record at 53 
Air Force po Iic) ' bar s a I I persons convic ted of se i I ii ig i\ ugs from 
enter ir ig , !Viii;ii IF "orce property, see recoi d at • M Oi ice a person is chat ged w i t I  ) 
sel ling drugs his secur i ty clearance is removed pending inves t iga t ion , see 
] ecoi til a I: M ' 
The \ iii I "orce has a serious concern with dn ig involvement of type by its 
employees see record at 43 A ill employees are advised of Ail % Force policy 
acknow 1 edged that the A ir Force po licy existed and tha t he had know ledge of 
it, see record at 54. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the appropriate standard of review, much of the decision of the 
Board of Review must be disregarded. 
The actions of Mr. Butler in selling cocaine, not only allowed, but 
required, the employer to discharge him. That discharge met the three 
criteria for just cause under the statute and related rules. 
Dishonesty, under the statute and regulations, means more than stealing 
from an employer. 
Mr. Butler's actions, in selling cocaine, were intentional and adverse 
to the interests of his employer and his status as a federal employee. 
The Unemployment Security Act and interpretive regulations are intended 
to assist those out of work through no fault of their own, a category which 
does not include Mr. Butler. 
The Board of Review's decision is not supported by the record. 
Mr. Butler resigned and should have been denied benefits for that reason 
alone. 
Mr. Butler's actions in selling cocaine were criminal. 
By his actions in selling cocaine, Mr. Butler lost required certifi-
cation and was not entitled to benefits. 
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may be technically correct it is incomplete in light of the uncontroverted 
evidence in the record at pages 51, 55 and 56 which shows that the reason Mr. 
Butler was not charged was because he agreed to cooperate by identifying 
suppliers and other persons with whom he had been involved in dealing 
narcotics. The finding by the Administrative Law Judge skirts the real issue 
identified by Rule R475-5b2-l(3)(c) which is that Mr. Butler was discharged 
for actions which constitute a crime. Mr. Butler admitted such actions 
during the hearing. At page 52 of the record, when asked about allegations 
allegations that he distributed cocaine, Mr. Butler said "... I did get her 
some, yes, I did." The "no crime" finding is a red herring and directly at 
odds with the uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Butler distributed cocaine. 
This erroneous finding impacts the discharged for a crime analysis discussed 
below. 
At page 65 of the record the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. 
Butler had no previous warnings concerning his job performance. While that 
statement on its face may be technically correct it is incomplete in light of 
the uncontroverted evidence in the record at page 54 which shows that Mr. 
Butler was aware, prior to his sale of cocaine, that drug involvement would 
lead to termination. The Administrative Law Judge appears to be attempting 
to bolster his decision by the use of an irrelevant finding on prior job 
performance. Justifiable termination for dishonesty, just cause, or crime do 
not turn on, or even relate to, whether or not the employee had a previously 
clean record. These are "cardinal sins", to use the industrial relations 
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parlance, and are all sufficient, in and of themselves, to support 
termination and denial of benefits. The implication of the Administrative 
Law Judge's finding is that the only employees who may be terminated are 
those who previously had poor attendance records or substandard performance 
regardless of heinous crimes they may have committed. 
At page 67 of the record, under reasoning and conclusions of law, the 
Administrative Law Judge states, without foundation "The employer accepted 
the report from the Air Force Office of Special Investigations on its face 
value without affording Mr. Butler an opportunity to represent his guilt or 
innocence in the matter." This finding is despite direct and uncontroverted 
evidence that the employer had notified the employee of his rights before the 
Merit Systems Protections Board. The claimant resigned without seeking the 
relief available before that board, while remaining employed. 
Each of the findings listed above should be disregarded under Hurst 
because they are without substantial support in the record and thus arbitrary 
and capricious. 
B 
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS RECEIVE NO DEFERENCE 
Appellate jurisdiction and procedure for rulings made by the Board of 
Review are provided for by U.C.A. 35-4-10. The statute provides that 
findings of fact, unless clearly erroneous, are conclusive and that review is 
limited to conclusions of law. This matter is thus subject to the general 
rule of the law of appeal and error to the effect that this court need give 
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no deference to the conclusions of law reached below, Kimball v. Campbell, 
699 P2d 714 (Utah, 1985). The legal conclusions reached by the 
Administrative Law Judge and sustained by the Board of Review are in error 
and do not follow from the evidence presented at the hearing. 
The Administrative Law Judge held, at page 66 of the record, and was 
supported by the Board or Review in its decision, 
1. The sale of controlled substances doesn't constitute 
dishonesty, and 
2. There was no showing that the claimants actions had a con-
nection with the employees duties or the employer's business interests. 
The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that the claimant was not 
not discharged for dishonesty. Neither party was represented by an attorney 
at the hearing. The employer articulated numerous reasons, all supported by 
adequate evidence which require the denial of benefits. That the Administra-
tive Law Judge chose to characterize the dismissal as one for dishonesty 
should not bind the employer to that legal theory where evidence was 
presented which would require denial of benefits on other theories. 
These legal conclusions are in error when viewed in light of the 
evidence presented at the hearing and should be ignored. 
II 
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE 
Rule R475-5bl-2 defines just cause as having three elements 
a. culpability, b. knowledge, and c. control. 
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A. CULPABILITY 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(a) establishes general criteria for culpability. 
"The wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the employer's rights." In 
analyzing culpability we must remember who the parties are. The employer is 
the United States Government, the employee is a jet mechanic who worked daily 
on multi-million dollar super sonic jet aircraft. 
The rights of the employer, pertaining to drug offenses, are broader 
than those of any other conceivable employer. This is the employer who, 
during the month Mr. Butler's appeal was heard, passed the National Narcotics 
Leadership Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690, filling 364 pages. The United 
States Government has waged war on drugs on many different fronts. One of 
the major problem areas addressed has been drugs in the military. The record 
shows that Mr. Butler was admonished by the commander of the organization 
employing him that drug involvement would not be tolerated. Those warnings, 
coupled with the United States Government's major offensive on drugs 
constitute major employer rights. 
Attached hereto as Attachment B is a copy of Executive Order 12584, 
issued by the President of the United States on September 15, 1986 entitled 
"Drug Free Federal Workplace. That Executive Order establishes national 
policy for all federal employees, Mr. Butler included. The Executive Order 
establishes national policy by ordering certain actions by federal employees 
and federal employers. 
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In the findings section of the Executive Order the President finds that 
illegal drugs involvement, on or off duty, 1. is inconsistent with the public 
trust placed in federal employees, 2. lessens effectiveness of those 
employees involved, 3. impairs the efficiency of government employers, and 4. 
is inconsistent with access to sensitive information. Mr. Butler was in the 
category of people defined by the Executive Order to be in sensitive 
positions. 
The Executive Order directs federal employers, the Air Force included, 
to initiate action to remove offending employees. The employers are autho-
rized to proceed on the basis of any appropriate evidence, conviction is not 
required. The offending employees retained their industrial due process 
rights under the Civil Service Reform Act. The Air Force's actions against 
Mr. Butler were required by and comported with Executive Order 12584. 
The Executive Order also issues specific directions to federal 
employees. They are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs (and 
by logical extension the sale of those drugs). The Executive Order refers 
only to the use of drugs, not to the consumption of drugs. It follows that 
anyone who sells drugs has used them even if they are in that rare category 
of drug dealers who has not consumed them. 
It takes little imagination to envision the public outcry which would 
arise if this federal employer failed to terminate the employment of drug 
dealers on it's payroll. 
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This case should be compared to that of Clearfield City v. Dept. of 
Employment Sec, 663 P2d 440 (Utah 1983). There an off duty police officer 
was denied benefits after having been charged with sodomy. The court ruled 
that the special status of the employer held the employee to a higher 
than might be required of other employees and disallowed benefits. (The 
policeman was ultimately acquitted or the sodomy charge). In citing a case 
of 
an employee of the federal government the Utah Supreme Court said, at 443, 
". . . a public or private employer has the right to expect his employees to 
refrain from acts which would bring dishonor on the business name or the 
institution." The court also cited another public employment case denying 
benefits ". . . the claimant had deliberately disregarded a statute which 
which his employer had the affirmative duty to administer and enforce." 
Public Law 100-690 places such a responsibility upon the Department of 
Defense and accordingly, upon the Air Force. 
Mr. Butler's employment required him to be responsible for highly 
valuable equipment and the lives of the men who operated it. While Mr. 
Butler asserts that he never used the drugs he sold at least one court has 
taken judicial notice that such is not generally the case. In Borsari v. 
F.A.A., 699 F2d 106, 111 (2CA, 1983) the court found "Although it may be true 
that an individual who has sold or possessed drugs is no more likely to have 
used them, it is reasonable to infer that as a group, individuals possessing 
drugs are more likely to employ them. Indeed the class of drug users must, 
in the nature of the act, be composed entirely of those who have possessed 
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illicit substances. As the ALJ conceded, 'to an employer, there is a greater 
risk that an employee who has once sold marijuana will use it than in the 
case of one who has never sold marijuana." The ruling of the Board of Review 
would require the Air Force to continue to employ Mr. Butler and those of his 
ilk until it could establish that they used them while working on supersonic 
jet aircraft, or be punished for terminating them. 
B. KNOWLEDGE 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(b) discusses the knowledge element of just cause. 
The uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Butler, and his coworkers were told 
by their employer that no drug involvement would be tolerated. Mr. Butler 
knew that he was subject to discharge for selling drugs. 
C. CONTROL 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(c) discusses the control element of just cause. The 
issue is whether or not the employee had the ability to prevent the acts 
which led to his termination. No one but Mr. Butler controlled of whether or 
not he sold cocaine. 
All of the elements of a just cause discharge under Rule R475-5bl-2 
were met in Mr. Butler's termination. That termination does not entitle him 
to unemployment benefits. 
Ill 
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR DISHONESTY 
Black's Law Dictionary does not define honest or honesty. It does 
define dishonesty as "Disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; untrustworthi-
12 
ness; lack of integrity." The first synonym for honest listed by The Random 
House Thesaurus, College Edition, is "law abiding". The act of selling 
cocaine is chargeable as a second degree felony under U.C.A. 58-37-8. It is 
also a crime chargeable under 21 U.S.C. 841. The latter statute being 
enacted by the United States of America, the employer of Mr. Butler. The 
natural, logical definitions of dishonesty include the claimant's actions. 
Nothing suggests that the definition should be as narrow as that used by the 
Administrative Law Judge and Board of Review. 
IV 
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR WILLFUL AND 
WANTON ACTS ADVERSE TO HIS EMPLOYER 
The Air Force firmly believes that the actions of the claimant fit 
within the parameters of both the statute and the regulation pertaining to 
acts constituting a crime. If the court reaches the conclusion that Mr. 
Butler's acts do not constitute a crime it must nonetheless deny benefits 
because the Claimant's acts were willful and wanton and adverse to the 
employer's rightful interest, as that term is used at U.C.A. 35-4-5(b)(l) for 
the same reasons as argued in the section on crime of this brief. 
V 
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED 
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
A 
THE RULE DOESN'T SUPPORT THE ACT 
While this court must give difference to the Industrial Commission's 
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rules and their interpretation that difference does not apply if the rule is 
not reasonable. In West Jordan v. Department of Employment Sec, 656 P.2d 
411, 412 (Utah, 1982) the Utah Supreme Court said "... agency decisions are 
still subject to judicial review and will be reversed where they are 
inconsistent with the governing legislation or the decision so this Court." 
The stated purpose of the Employment Security Act is to benefit the 
". . . health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state", U.C.A. 
35-4-2. The description of that purpose was amplified by the Industrial 
Commission in rule R475-2-1(1) "One of the purposes of the Employment 
Security Act is the lighten the burdens of persons unemployed through no 
fault of their own . . . ." That language of the rule was apparently taken 
directly from the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Olof Nelson Consts. Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d 951, 958 (1952). The "through 
no fault of his own" language in the both the rule and the Olof Nelson case 
state the purpose of the act. The clear, uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. 
Butler claimant was in complete control of his actions and chose to sell 
drugs. His discharge and resulting unemployment was not "through no fault of 
his own". He had a secure job with the most complete set of industrial due 
process rights existing anywhere in in the world yet chose to deliberately 
flout his employers clearly stated policy against any drug involvement. The 
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state are not uplifted in 
any fashion by requiring the federal government to employ drug dealers. 
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The Board of Review decision upholding the Administrative Law Judge's 
determination can only stand if this court completely ignores both the 
clearly stated policy of the Act and the Supreme Court's prior decisions 
interpreting it. 
B 
THE RULES ARE RANDOMLY APPLIED 
Attached hereto as Attachment A is a copy of the Board of Review 
decision in Johnson v. Industrial Commission, Case number 880703-CA. In that 
case the Board of Review upheld the Administrative Law Judge's decision not 
to allow benefits where an employee violated his employers drug and alcohol 
policy through off base use. 
The employer's drug and alcohol policy could not be any more strict in 
Johnson than in this case yet the Board of Review failed to take The Air 
Force's policy into account. In Johnson the Board of Review relied upon the 
claimant's violation of state drug laws, including U.C.A. 58-37-8, but 
refused to give an identical argument any weight here. This is despite the 
claimant's specific admission to such conduct during the hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
The fact that Mr. Butler was discovered to have been involved with 
drugs through and undercover buy from him does not lessen the application of 
the legislative finding, stated at U.C.A. 34-38-1, that a drug free work 
force is a laudable goal. The Board of Review's sustaining the employer in 
it's attempts to achieve this goal in Johnson only makes its failure to do so 
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in this case that much more mystifying. 
Similarly in Comer, the companion case to this case, the same 
Administrative Law Judge who decided this case found that another Air Force 
employee, who also admitted to selling drugs had committed a crime. 
While the appellant is not arguing that the Johnson case is precedent in 
this case the Board of Review's application of different rules to similar 
circumstances can only lead to the conclusion that the rules are not 
reasonable and rationally applied as required by the Supreme Court in the 
West Jordan case. 
VI 
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED 
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT REGULATIONS 
Industrial Commission Rule R475-2-1(1) was cited in the next proceeding 
section as stating the legislative intent of the Act. As the preamble, that 
rule also states the intent of the rest of the unemployment compensation 
regulations. That intent is to provide relief for persons unemployed 
"through no fault of their own". For the reasons stated in section A of the 
next preceding section of this brief Mr. Butler's actions should deny him 
benefits because his loss of employment was through his own fault. 
VII 
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD'S RESULT 
As with all finders of fact the Administrative Law Judge in this action, 
and the Board of Review after him, were bound to rely upon the facts within 
16 
the record. That Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review both 
ignored uncontroverted evidence which require denial of benefits. That 
evidence includes 
(a) The claimant's admission of distribution of cocaine, record at 10, 
10, 39, 43, 44, 52, 55, and 56, showing dishonesty, actions constituting a 
crime, and violation of his employer's stated policy on drugs. That the 
Administrative Law Judge and subsequently the Board of Review both ignored or 
misconstrued these facts can be clearly seen from the Administrative Law 
Judge's conversation with the employer's representative on pages 57 and 58 of 
the record where he states that Mr. Butler denied making an admission in the 
face of clear language from the claimant's own lips two pages earlier in the 
record, 
(b) The claimant's resignation, see record at 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 26, 
27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 46, and 56, placing the burden of proof and the burden of 
going forward on the claimant, rather than the employer, 
(c) The claimant's industrial due process rights before the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, see record at 2, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30, and 53 
showing his voluntary resignation from work rather than his termination by 
his employer and that, had he not been terminated for just cause, he could 
have and should have pursued his cause through administrative channels 
established by the United States Congress, 
(d) The other individuals involved in the distribution of drugs were 
Mr. Butler's co-workers at Hill Air Force Base, record at 41, 53, and 54, 
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showing work involvement, 
(e) The claimant's understanding of the employer's explicit no drug 
policy, see record at 54, showing culpability and just cause for dismissal 
(had employment been terminated by dismissal rather than resignation), and 
(f) The Air Force has a strong anti-drug policy, see record at 38, and 
48, showing that off base drug sales are work related. 
VIII 
MR. BUTLER RESIGNED BUT DID NOT LEAVE 
FOR GOOD CAUSE 
The uncontroverted evidence in the record is that Mr. Butler resigned. 
Mr. Butler would have be justified in leaving work had that departure been 
for "good cause". Good cause is defined by Rule 475-5a-2(l). "Good cause is 
established if continuance of the employment would have had an adverse effect 
on the claimant which could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated 
immediate severance of the employment relationship, or if the work was 
illegal, or unsuitable new work." Mr. Butler's resignation could not have 
been for good cause because of the mechanism established to allow him to 
grieve and appeal any adverse action taken against him. As noted in the 
record Mr. Butler received notice of his rights but failed to avail himself 
of these remedies. 
The Merit Systems Protection Board was established by an act of Congress 
to provide industrial due process to federal employees. The record shows 
that Mr. Butler was notified that his employer was taking the first steps in 
that process employees. The record shows that Mr. Butler was notified that 
18 
his employer was taking the first steps in that process. Mr. Butler was not 
fired but received a "Notice of Proposed Removal" see record at 2, 19-23. It 
must be noted that even though Mr. Butler had been barred from his employer's 
premises he was still being paid and was not, indeed could not, be terminated 
without his employer's adherence to procedures established by the Office of 
Personnel Management pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1101 et.seq. and the Merit Systems 
Protection Board pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1201 et.seq. and contained in the Code 
of Federal Regulations at 5 C.F.R. 1201.1, et.seq. 
Mr. Butler's next logical step, after having received the Notice of 
Proposed Removal, should have been to oppose the removal through the admini-
strative procedure established for his protection. Had the decision been 
adverse to him he could have appealed. Instead Mr. Butler could see the 
inevitable, and opted to resign. In order for his resignation to have been 
for good cause he would had to have met the criteria established under Rule 
R475-5a-2. 
The first criteria is adverse effect. This must have a showing of 
actual or potential harm. No such harm could have been shown because he 
remained on his employer's payroll during the entire procedure, free to 
return to work once exonerated by the appeals system. 
The second criteria is Mr. Butler's ability to control or prevent the 
alleged problem. He could have retained control in two ways. He could have 
chosen not to sell cocaine, or he could have established, through the admini-
strative procedure that it would have been inappropriate to terminate him. 
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These two criteria are the only two identified under F475-5a-2 which have 
even remote application to the circumstances of Mr. Butler's termination. 
Neither establish that his resignation was for good cause. He voluntarily 
left work and should have been denied benefits based on the uncontroverted 
evidence in the record. 
IX 
THE CLAIMANT WAS DISCHARGED FOR DISHONESTY 
CONSTITUTING A CRIME 
U.C.A. 35-4-5(b)(2) denies the claimant benefits if he was discharged 
for dishonesty constituting a crime. Commission Rule R475-5b2 elaborates. 
"A crime is a punishable act in violation of law: an offense against the 
State or the United States", R475-05b2(l). R475-5b2(3) lists the elements as 
a. in connection with work, b. dishonesty, and c. admitted or established by 
a conviction in a court of law. 
As shown above in the discussion on "Just Cause" the claimant's actions 
in selling cocaine were in connection with work. This follows from the fact 
that his employer is charged by the United States Congress with eradicating 
drug abuse, the fact that he, and his fellow employees, had been advised that 
any drug involvement would result in termination. 
As shown above Mr. Butler's actions in selling cocaine were dishonest in 
that they were not "law abiding". 
The only issue remaining is whether his actions were admitted or 
established by a conviction in a court of law. The Administrative Law Judge 
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stressed that Mr. Butler had not been arrested or convicted in a court of 
law. Lack of arrest or conviction is of no consequence where Mr. Butler 
admitted criminal activity in the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge. At several places in the record Mr. Butler specifically admitted 
obtaining cocaine for distribution. R475-5(b)(3) only requires an admission, 
not an admission and arrest or an admission and conviction. Rule R475-5b2-4 
confirms that this interpretation is correct. 
This construction is in keeping with language of the statute. U.C.A. 
35-4-5(b)(2) invokes ineligibility for dishonest acts constituting a crime 
not acts resulting in arrest or conviction. The obvious purpose is to avoid 
placing a "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof on an employer. Here 
Mr. Butler's several specific admissions of criminal activity prove both the 
"dishonesty constituting a crime" requirement of the statute and the 
"admission" requirement of the rule. 
The actions of Mr. Butler meet the statutory definition of dishonesty 
constituting a crime and should result in denial of benefits. 
X 
THE CLAIMANT LOST HIS LICENSE 
Rule 475-5b-8(5) identifies an appropriate reason for discharge "When an 
employee loses a license which he knows is required for the performance of 
the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances which resulted 
in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying." 
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As a jet mechanic Mr. Butler was required to have a current security 
clearance. The uncontroverted evidence is that the Air Force Security 
Clearance Office, in Washington D.C. suspends the security clearances of drug 
offenders, see record at 44 and 45. The Security Clearance Office is not 
under the control of Air Force Officials at Hill Air Force Base and that 
office's independent action constitutes a lose of license under the rule. 
The respondent may argue that suspending Mr. Butler's security clearance 
is an act over which the employer had control and may not be used as an 
independent ground for termination. The logical extension of that argument 
is that the State of Utah will never be justified in terminating a driver 
under this regulation because the Department of Motor Vehicles is an agency 
of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
The Administrative Law Judge in this action completely ignored relevant 
law, facts in the record, and commonly used definitions of words in order to 
achieve his goal of awarding Mr. Butler unemployment benefits. Mr. Butler 
admitted selling cocaine. That sale constituted adequate grounds to allow 
any employer to terminate an employee for cause and to deny benefits. 
In this case other special facts make the Board of Review's support of 
the Administrative Law Judge's ruling even more inappropriate. First, Mr. 
Butler had substantial industrial due process rights. Had he truly felt he 
was being unjustly terminated he could have followed that process, while 
remaining on the payroll. Second, Mr. Butler, and his fellow federal 
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employees, are held to a higher standard because of the special status of 
their employer. Mr. Butler was informed of this by his commander. All 
federal employees are presumed to have notice of their status by virtue of 
Executive Order 12584. 
Mr. Butler's termination, without benefits, was appropriate under the 
majority of operative provisions of the Departments Regulations. The denial 
of benefits is clearly supported by the evidence while the granting of 
benefits is not. The decision of the Board of Review should be reversed and 
benefits denied. 
Dated this ?£?^dav of Xrf&y 1989 
DEE V. BENSON 
United States Attorney 
by 
Robert 
Special Assistant 
United States Attorney 
Clare A. Jdrfes 
Special Assistant 
United States Attorney 
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ME INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UT( 
JEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITT 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Douglas K. Butler 
1263 Sheridan Drive 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
S.S.A. No. 528-92-1200 
Case No. 88-A-4964 
APPEAL FILED: October 28, 1988 DATE OF HEARING: November 21, 1988 
APPEARANCES: Claimant and Employer PLACE OF HEARING: Ogden, Utah 
The Department's decision dated October 27, 1988 denied unemployment insurance 
benef i ts beginning October 2, 1988 and ending f i f t y - t w o weeks af ter separation on 
September 16, 1989, holding the claimant was discharged from his employment for an 
act cons t i tu t ing a crime. Sections 35-4-5(b)(2) and 35-4-5(b)( l ) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act are quoted on the attached sheet. 
Ju r i sd i c t i on fo r t h i s review is established in accordance with Section 35-4-6(c) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertain ing thereto. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The claimant worked as an a i r c r a f t mechanic fo r H i l l A i r Force Base from January 9, 
1982 to September 25, 1988. He was terminated from his employment for an off-duty 
offense which was related to the possession and d i s t r i b u t i o n of a control led sub-
stance. 
The c la iman ts posi t ion on the base required that he possess a secret security 
clearance. During the spring and summer of 1988, the claimant and other co-workers 
i n his department became subject to an invest igat ion by the Air Force Office of 
Special Invest igat ions. An informant in the claimant 's department made numerous 
telephone ca l l s to him at his home a f te r regular duty hours to request his assis-
tance in obtain ing a contro l led substance. The claimant explained that he did not 
use drugs and did not want to be involved in any type of i l l ega l a c t i v i t i e s . The 
co-worker ins is ted that t he i r fr iendship would not be breached i f he could act as a 
go-between in helping him purchase some drugs. The claimant relented and agreed to 
meet the co-worker at an off-base s i te to consumate the drug t ransact ion. He was 
given money by the informant and la te r returned with a quantity of cocaine. 
On September 8, 1988 the claimant was confronted by undercover agents of the Ai r 
Force and t o l d tha t warrants were being issued fo r his ar res t . He was to ld that he 
would not be arrested at that time i f he agreed to cooperate with the o f f i ce rs . He 
provided information to the of f icers regarding the part ies who had supplied him 
drugs. A report of the invest igat ion was subsequently submitted to the Personnel 
Of f ice and the claimant and three other employees of the base were issued Notice of 
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Proposed Removal letters at that time. As part of the employer's strict adherence 
to mandated drug rules, an order was issued September 2, 1988 prohibiting the 
claimant to re-enter the military reservation. The claimant was removed from his 
position at Hill Air Force Base through an action initiated by the employer on 
September 25, 1988. The claimant is in the process of grieving his separation. 
The claimant has not been served a warrant or been further advised that he has been 
charged with any crime. He has retained an attorney who has been in contact with 
the Weber County Attorney's Office to determine the status of any forthcoming 
charges. 
The claimant had received no previous warnings concerning his job performance. He 
had been considered to be a satisfactory employee until the drug related incident 
was brought to the attention of management. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The claimant was denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds he was 
discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-5(b)(2) provide in 
pertinent part: 
A.l. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law; an 
offense against the State of the United States. "Crime" and 
"misdemeanor" are synonymous terms; though in common usage 
crime is used to denote offenses of a more serious nature. 
However, for example: an insignificant, although illegal act 
or the taking of something which is of little or no value, or 
believed to have been abandoned, may not be sufficient to 
establish that a crime was committed as definied for the appli-
cation of this section of the Act, even if the claimant was 
found guilty of a violation of the law. 
A.2. The duty of honesty is implied in any employment relation-
ship. A worker is obligated to deal with his employer in 
truthfulness and good faith. An individual discharged for 
dishonesty constituting a crime connected with his work is at 
fault in his resulting unemployment. The 52-week disqualifica-
tion for "dishonesty constituting a crime" required by the 
statute is a mandatory penalty. 
A.3. The basic factors which are essential for a disqualifi-
cation under this provision of the law are that the individual 
was discharged for a crime that was: 
a. In connection with work 
b. Dishonest 
c. Admitted or established by a conviction in a court of 
law. 
onnnR^ 
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B. IN CONNECTION WITH WORK. 
The connection to the work is not l im i ted to offenses which 
take place on the employer's premises or during business hours. 
The employer does not have to be the v ic t im of the crime, but 
the crime must adversely af fect the employer's r i gh t f u l i n te r -
ests. I t is necessary that the conduct have a "connection" to 
the employee's duties and to the employer's business that is i t 
a subject of legi t imate and s ignf icant concern. A l l employer, 
both publ ic and pr iva te , have the r igh t to expect employees to 
re f ra in from acts which are detrimental to the business or 
would br ing dishonor on the business name or the i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Legitimate interests of employers inc lude, but are not l imi ted 
t o : goodwill of customers, reputation of the business, e f f i -
ciency, business costs, morale of employees, d i s c i p l i n e , t r u s t , 
honesty and loya l t y . 
C. DISHONESTY 
Dishonesty in this context generally means theft, but may also 
include other criminal acts connected with the work that render 
the employee untrustworthy or show a lack of integrity. Dis-
honesty not involving a crime may still be disqualifying under 
the provisions of Section 5(b)(1). 
In the present case, the alleged offense took place outside the military installa-
tion. To the date of the hearing, there was no arrest or conviction in a court of 
law. The employer failed to show the conduct had a connection with the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business interests. Furthermore, the act of possessing 
or distributing a controlled substance does not meet the statutory definition for 
"dishonesty". Under these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge holds the 
claimant was not discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime. 
The fact remains, the claimant was terminated from his employment because of his 
involvement in the sale of a controlled substance. The case will, therefore, be 
adjudicated under the provisions of the law pertaining to discharge to determine if 
the evidence supports a position that the employer had just cause for dismissing 
the claimant. 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provide in 
pertinent part: 
A. . . . Unemployment insurance benefits will be denied if the 
employer had just cause for discharging the employee. However, 
not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny benefits. 
In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 
35-4-5(b)(l) there must be some fault on the part of the 
employee involved. 
B. JUST CAUSE 
1 . The basic factors which establ ish j u s t cause, and are essen-
t i a l for a determination of i n e l i g i b i l i t y are: 
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a. Culpabi l i ty 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of 
the offense as i t affects continuance of the employment 
re la t ionsh ip . The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potent ial harm to the employer's r i gh t fu l 
i n t e r e s t s . 
B. 1 . b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected. It is not necessary that the claimant 
intended to cause harm to the employer, but he should reason-
ably have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct would 
have. 
B. 1. c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of the 
claimant to control or prevent. 
C. BURDEN OF PROOF 
1 . In a discharge, the employer i n i t i a t e s the separation and, 
as such, is the primary source of information wi th regard to 
the reasons for the dismissal. The employer has the burden 
of proof which is the respons ib i l i ty to establ ish the facts 
resu l t ing i n the discharge. 
G. IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT 
Disqual i fy ing conduct is not l imi ted to offenses which take 
place on the employer's premises or during business hours. I t 
i s only necessary that the conduct have such "connection" to 
the employee's duties and to the employer's business that i t i s 
a subject of legi t imate and s ign i f i can t concern to the employer. 
A l l employers, both public and pr ivate have the r igh t to expect 
employees to re f ra in from acts which are detrimental to the 
business or would bring dishonor on the business name or the 
i n s t i t u t i o n . Legitimate interests of employers include, but 
are not l im i ted t o : goodwill of customers, reputat ion of the 
business, e f f i c iency , business costs, morale of employees, 
d i s c i p l i n e , honesty, t rus t and l oya l t y . 
In the present case, the claimant, at the time of separat ion, was a suspect in a 
case invo lv ing the possession and d is t r i bu t ion of a con t ro l led substance. Although 
he had been implicated i n the sale, he had not been arrested nor had he been charged 
with any i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s . The employer accepted the report from the Ai r Force 
Of f ice of Special Investigations on i t s face value without affording the claimant 
an opportunity to represent his gu i l t or innocence in the matter. The employer 
re l i ed so le ly on the invest igat ion report which alleged the claimant had been 
involved in the sale of a control led substance. The offense occurred while the 
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claimant was o f f duty and there is no evidence in the record to show that any 
special notor ie ty was given to the case which would have i den t i f i ed the claimant as 
an employee of H i l l Air Force Base. The claimant emphatically denies using drugs 
or pa r t i c ipa t ing in any other ac t i v i t i e s which would have involved the possession 
or d i s t r i bu t i on of control led substances. The claimant had worked for the employer 
for almost seven years and was considered to be a sa t is fac tory employee. The only 
supportable conclusion to be adduced from the evidence presented by the parties is 
that the claimant was discharged for his of f -duty conduct which resulted in the 
confrontat ion wi th agents from the Air Force Office of Special Invest igat ions. The 
employer f a i l ed to show the conduct had any d i rect connection to the employee's 
dut ies , or the employer's legi t imate business in te res ts . While the employer's 
motives for invest igat ing employees under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n in an attempt to provide 
a re la t i ve l y drug-free work environment are commendable, there is insu f f i c ien t 
evidence in the record to show the claimant's act ions, as shown to be connected 
with the work, r ise to the level of cu lpab i l i t y so as to const i tu te d isqual i fy ing 
conduct under the terms of the s ta tu te . The Administrat ive Law Judge, therefore, 
concludes the claimant was not discharged from his employment fo r j us t cause. 
DECISION: 
The Department's decision denying to pay the claimant unemployment insurance bene-
f i t s pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-4-5(b)(2) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act is reversed. The claimant is allowed unemployment insurance benefits 
e f fec t ive October 2, 1988, provided he is otherwise e l i g i b l e . 
Norman Barnes 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision w i l l become f ina l unless, wi th in ten days from November 23, 1988, 
fu r ther wr i t ten appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
C i ty , Utah 84147) set t ing f o r t h the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
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BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
SMH/NB/LB/cdm 
DOUGLAS K. BUTLER 
S.S.A. No. 528-92-1200 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Case No. 88-A-4964-UCFE 
DECISION 
Case No. 88-BR-454-UCFE 
The 
Administrative 
his employment 
allowed payment 
and continuing, 
35-4-5(b)(2) of 
employer, Hill Air Force Base, appeals the decision of the 
Law Judge which held that the claimant was not discharged from 
at Hill Air Force Base for just cause. The ALJ therefore 
of unemployment insurance benefits effective October 2, 1988 
provided claimant is otherwise eligible, pursuant to Section 
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
c n • £ft/r carefu1 consideration of the record in this matter, the Board 
of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be a correct 
application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, supported 
by competent evidence, and therefore affirms the decision. In so holding, the 
Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Late City, Utah 84102. To file an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing Statement and a 
Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
Dated this 32st day of January, 1989. 
Date Mailed: February 3, 1989" ^y> ^ € - ^ ^ ^ _ 
0(KW7<: 
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S.S.A. No. 528-92-1200 Case No. 88-8R-454-UCFE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the 
following on t h i s 3 ^ day of February, 1989 by mailing the 
same, postage prepaid, United States mail to: 
Air Force, Hill Air Force Base 
2849 ABG/DPCEB 
Civilian Personnel, D. Mabel 
Hill Air Force Base, UT 84056 
Randine Salerno 
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite #204 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Douglas K. Butler 
1263 Sheridan Drive 
Ogden, UT 84404 
Cherie D. MorgayC 
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Title 3— Executive Order 12564 of September 15, 1986 
The President Drug-Free Federal Workplace 
I RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that: 
Drug use is having serious adverse effects upon a significant proportion of the 
national work force and results in billions of dollars of lost productivity each 
yean 
The Federal government aa aa employer, is concerned with the well-being of 
its employees, the successful accomplishment of agency missions, and the 
need to maintain employee productivity; 
The Federal government as the largest employer in the Nation, can and 
should show the w£y towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a 
program designed to offer drug users a helping hand and at the same time. 
demonstrating to drug users and potential drug users that drugs will not be 
tolerated in the Federal workplace; 
The profits from illegal drugs provide the single greatest source of income for 
organized crime, fuel violent street crime, and otherwise contribute to the 
breakdown of our society; 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees is inconsistent 
not only with the law-abiding behavior expected of all citizens, but also with 
the special trust placed in such employees as servants of the public; 
Federal employees who use illegal drugs, on or off duty, tend to be less 
productive, less reliable, and prone to greater absenteeism than their fellow 
employees who do not use illegal drugs; 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees impairs the 
efficiency of Federal departments and agencies, undermines public confidence 
in them, and makes it more difficult for other employees who do not use illegal 
drugs to perform their jobs effectively. The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, 
by Federal employees also can pose a serious health and safety threat to 
members of the public and to other Federal employees; 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees in certain 
positions evidences less than the complete reliability, stability, and good 
judgment that is consistent with access to sensitive information and creates 
the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under pressure 
that may pose a serious risk to national security, the public safety, and the 
effective enforcement of the law; and 
Federal employees who use illegal drugs must themselves be primarily respon-
sible for changing their behavior and, if necessary, begin the process of 
rehabilitating themselves. 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States of America, including section 3301(2) of Title 5 of the United 
States Code, section 73C1 of Title 5 of the United States Code, section 290ee-l 
of Title 42 of the United States Code, deeming such action in the best interests 
of national security, public health and safety, law enforcement and the 
efficiency of the Federal service, and in order to establish standards and 
procedures to ensure fairness in achieving a drug-free Federal workplace and 
to protect the privacy of Federal employees, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section L Drug-Free Workplace. 
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs. 
Atrh 1 
(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off duty, 
is contrary to the efficiency of the service. 
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment 
Sec 2. Agency Responsibilities. 
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall develop a plan for achieving the 
objective of a drug-free workplace with due consideration of the rights of the 
government the employee, and the general public. 
(b) Each agency plan shall include: 
(1) A statement of policy setting forth the agency's expectations regarding 
drug use and the action to be anticipated in response to identified drug use; 
(2) Employee Assistance Programs emphasizing high level direction, educa-
tion, counseling, referral to rehabilitation, and coordination with available 
community resources; 
(3) Supervisory training to assist in identifying and addressing illegal drug use 
by agency employees; 
i4) Provision for self-referrals as well as supervisory referrals to treatment 
with maximum respect for individual confidentiality consistent with safety 
and security issues; and 
(5) Provision for identifying illegal drug users, including testing on a controlled 
and carefully monitored basis in accordance with this Order. 
Sec. 3. Drug Testing Programs. 
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test for the 
use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which 
such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined 
by the head of each agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission 
and its employees1 duties, the efficient use of agency resources, and the 
danger to the public health and safety or national security that could result 
from the failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or her position. 
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program for voluntary 
employee drug testing. 
(c) In addition to the testing authorized m subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section, the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee 
for illegal drug use under the following circumstances: 
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion tint any employee uses illegal drugs; 
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or 
unsafe practice; or 
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal drug 
use through an Employee Assistance Program. 
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for 
illegal drug use. 
Sec 4. Drug Testing Procedures. 
(a) Sixty days prior to the implementation of a drug testing program pursuant 
to this Order, agencies shall notify employees that testing for use of illegal 
drugs is to be conducted and that they may seek counseling and rehabilitation 
and inform them of the procedures for obtaining such assistance through the 
agency's Employee Assistance Program. Agency drug testing programs al-
ready ongoing are exempted from the 60-day notice requirement Agencies 
may take action under section 3(c) of this Order without reference to the 60-
day notice period 
(b) Before conducting a drug test the agency shall inform the employee to be 
tested of the opportunity to submit medical documentation that may support a 
legitimate use for a specific drug. 
(c) Drug testing programs shall contain procedures for timely submission of 
requests for retention of records and specimens; procedures for retesting; and 
procedures, consistent with applicable law, to protect the confidentiality of 
test results and related medical and rehabilitation records. Procedures for 
providing urine specimens must allow individual privacy, uniesn the agency 
has reason to believe that a particular individual may alter or substitute the 
specimen to be provided 
(d) The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to promulgate 
scientific and technical guidelines for drug testing programs, and agencies 
shall conduct their drug testing programs in accordance with these guidelines 
once promulgated 
Sec. 5. Personnel Actions. 
(a) Agencies shall in addition to any appropriate personnel actions, refer any 
employee who is found to use illegal drugs to an Employee Assistance 
Program for assessment counseling, and referral for treatment or rehabilita-
tion as appropriate. 
(b) Agencies shall initiate action to discipline any employee who is found to 
use illegal drugs, provided that such action is not required for an employee 
who: 
(1) Voluntarily identifies himseif as a user of illegal drugs or who volunteers 
for drug testing pursuant to secftm 3(b) of this Order, pnor to bemg identified 
through other means; 
(2) Obtains counseling or re&abctttstian through an Employee Assistance 
Program; and 
(3} Thereafter refrains from using illegal drugs. 
(c) Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain on duty in a sensitive 
position who is found to use illegal drugs, pnor to successful completion of 
rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program. However, as part of a 
rehabilitation or counseling program, the head of an Executive agency may. in 
his or her discretion, allow an employee to return to duty in a sensitive 
position if it is determined that this action would not pose a danger to public 
health or safety or the national aecunty. 
(d) Agencies shall initiate action to remove from the service any employee 
who is found to use illegal drugs and: 
(1) Refuses to obtain counseling or rehabilitation through an Employee Assist* 
ance Program; or 
(2) Does not thereafter refrain from using illegal drugs. 
(e) The results of a drug test and information developed by the agency in the 
course of the drug testing of the employee may be considered in processing 
any adverse action against the employes or for other administrative purposes. 
Preliminary test results may not be used in an administrative proceeding 
unless they are confirmed by a second analysis of the same sample or unless 
the employee confirms the accuracy of tbe initial test by admitting the use of 
illegal drugs. 
(!) The determination of an agency that an employee uses illegal drugs can be 
made on the basis of any appropriate evidence, including direct observation, a 
criminal conviction, administrative inquiry, or the results of an authorized 
testing program. Positive drug test results may be rebutted by other evidence 
that an employee has not used illegal drugs. 
(g) Any action to discipline an employee who is using illegal drugs (including 
removal from the service, if appropnate] shall be taken in compliance with 
otherwise applicable procedures, including the Civil Service Reform Act. 
(h) Drug testing shall not be conducted pursuant to this Order for the purpose 
of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings. Agencies are not 
required to report to the Attorney General for investigation or prosecution any 
information, allegation, or evidence relating to violations of Title 21 of the 
United States Code received as a result of the operation of drug testing 
programs established pursuant to this Order. 
Sec 8. Coordination of Agency Programs. 
(a) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall: 
(1) Issue government-wide guidance to agencies on the implementation of the 
terms of this Order 
(2) Ensure that appropriate coverage for drug abuse is maintained for employ-
ees and their families under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: 
(3) Develop a model Employee Assistance Program for Federal agencies and 
assist the agencies in putting programs in place: 
(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, develop 
and improve training programs for Federal supervisors and managers on 
illegal drug use: and 
(5) In cooperation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
heads of Executive agencies, mount an intensive drug awareness campaign 
throughout the Federal work force. 
(b) The Attorney General shall render legal advice regarding the implementa-
tion of this Order and shall be consulted with regard to all guidelines, 
regulations, and policies proposed to be adopted pursuant to this Order. 
(c) Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to limit the authorities of the 
Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as 
amended, or the statutory authorities of the National Security Agency or the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. Implementation of this Order within the Intelli-
gence Community, as defined in Executive Order No. 12333, shall be subject to 
the approval of the head of the affected agency. 
Sec 7. Definitions. 
(a) This Order applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch. 
(b) For purposes of this Order, the term "agency" means an_Executive agency. 
as defined in 5 U.S.C 105: the Uniformed Services, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 
2101(3) (but excluding the armed forces as defined by 5 U.S.C. 2101(2)); or any 
other employing unit or authority of the Federal government, except the 
United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, and employing 
units or authorities in the Judicial and Legislative Branches. 
(c) For purposes of this Order, the term "illegal drugs" means a controlled 
substance included in Schedule I or II, as defined by section 802(6) of Title 21 
of the United States Code, the possession of which is unlawful under chapter 
Tl3 of that Title. The term "illegal drugs" does not mean the use of a controlled 
2_substance pursuant to a valid prescription or other uses authorized by law. 
(d) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee in a sensitive position" 
refers to: 
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special Sensi-
tive, Critical-Sensitive, or Noncritical-Sensitive under Chapter 731 of the 
Federal Personnel Manual or an employee in a position that an agency head 
designates as sensitive in accordance with Executive Order No. 10450, as 
amended; 
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information or 
may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a determination of 
trustworthiness by an agency head under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 
12358: 
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments: 
(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 U.S.C 8331(20); and 
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(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement 
national security, the protection of life and property, public health or safety, or 
other functions requiring a high degree of trust and confidence. 
(e) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee" means all persons 
appointed in the Civil Service as described in 5 U.S.C. 2105 (but excluding 
persona appointed in the armed services as defined in 5 U.S.C 2102(2)]. 
(f) For purposes of this Order, the term "Employee Assistance Program'* 
means agency-based counseling programs that offer assessment short-term 
counseling, and referral services to employees for a wide range of drug, 
alcohol and mental health programs that affect employee job performance. 
Employee Assistance Programs are responsible for referring drug-using em-
ployees for rehabilitation and for monitoring employees' progress while in 
treatment 
Sec 8. Effective Date. This Order is effective immediately. 
THE WHITE HOUSE, 
September 15, 1986. 
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R475-2-1 Preamble 
R475-2-2. Evidenuary Requirements 
R475-2-1. Preamble 
1 One of the purposes of the Employment Secu-
rity Act is to lighten the burdens of persons unemp-
loyed through no fault of their own by maintaining 
their purchasing power in the economy The legisla-
ture in establishing this program, recognized the 
substantial social ills associated with unemployment 
and sought to ameliorate these problems with a 
program to pay workers for a limited time while they 
seek other employment It is because of these reasons 
that it is in the public interest to liberally construe 
and administer the Act It is important that both the 
worker seeking benefits and the employer who will 
ultimately pay for such benefits understand the 
process by which contributions are assessed and 
benefits are paid The following Rules are written to 
explain and clarify the application of the Act In 
applying these Rules to individual cases the Depart-
ment will consider the reasonableness of claimant's 
action, the totality of the employment situation, and 
whether the claimant has a genuine continuing atta-
chment to the labor market 
2 The Utah Department of Employment Security 
has an obligation to be unbiased in administration of 
the Act Therefore, the Department must allow ail 
parties due process betore dispensing the revenues 
provided by the Employment Security Act in order to 
protect the investment of employers who contributed 
to the unemployment insurance fund, the interests of 
the unemployed workers who may be eligible for the 
dollars provided by the fund, and the community 
which benefits from a stable workforce through the 
maintenance of purchasing power Due process req-
uires that employers will not be charged contribut-
ions for benefits, and workers will not be denied 
benefits, without the opportunity to provide mfor-
mation and contest or refute the information consi-
dered in the decision making process 
3 When an eligible worker has no work available 
there exists no controversy between the worker, the 
employer, or the Department and benefits must be 
paid promptly if all the provisions of Act are met 
However, when a worker quits, is fired, or has any 
other issue under the law an investigation of the cir-
cumstances must take place to determine if benefits 
can be paid In determining whether or not the 
worker is eligible for benefits, his actions arc meas-
ured against the standards of just cause following a 
discharge, and good cause and equity and good 
conscience following a voluntary separation from 
employment When one party fails to provide mfor-
mation or when that mformation is less credible, the 
result is that the party who has the responsibility to 
provide information may not prevail in its position 
R475-2-2. Evidentiary Requirements 
The evidentiary requirement for Department deci-
sions \s a preponderance of the evidence It \s not 
necessary to meet criminal court standards of beyond 
reasonable doubt or overwhelming evidence Prepo-
nderance means evidence which is of greater weight 
or more convincing than the evidence which is 
offered in opposition to it, that is, evidence which as 
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is 
more probable than not Although the evidence that 
is required for an appeal decision must be of proba-
tive value, an initial determination must be made 
based on the best or most logical information avail-
able Sworn testimony or first-hand statements have 
greater behevability than unsworn statements or 
hearsay A great deal of information is provided to 
the Department through telephone conversations and 
written reports. While the information provided in 
this manner will always be considered by the Depar-
tment, it cannot be relied upon more than credible 
sworn testimony when the parties have been given an 
opportunity to present evidence m person 
Hearsay, which is information provided by a 
source whose credibility cannot be tested through 
cross-examination, has inherent infirmities which 
make it unreliable The failure of one party to 
provide mformation either initially or at the appeals 
hearing severely limits the amount and quality of 
information upon which to base a good decision 
Therefore, it is necessary for all parties to actively 
participate in the decision making process by provi-
ding accurate and complete information m a timely 
manner to assure the protection of the interests of 
each party and preserve the social integrity of the 
unemployment insurance system 
1987 35-4-2 
R475-3a. Bi-Weekly Payment of 
Benefits 
R475-3a-l General Definition 
R475-3a-l. General Definition 
Eligibility for benefits is established with regard to 
a calendar week Benefits shall be paid on a bi-
weekly basis Therefore, benefits will not become due 
until the end of a two-week period for which ben-
efits are claimed in accordance with regulations 
governing the filing of claims 
19S7 35-4-3» 
R475-3b. Weekly Benefit Amount 
R475-3b-l General Definition 
R475-3b-2. Total Wages 
R475-3b-3. Early Determination 
R475-3b-4. Revision of Regular Monetary Determination 
R475-3b-5. Wages Paid 
R475-3b-6. Wages Paid During the Quarter 
R475-3b-7. Calendar Quarter 
R475-36-8. Retirement or Disability Retirement Income 
R475-3b-l. General Definition 
This section of the Act outlines the procedure for 
determining the Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) and 
the Maximum Benefit Amount (MBA) which an eli-
gible claimant can receive and recomputations based 
on retirement income Claimants are instructed when 
filing the initial claim to report all base period emp-
loyers. Employers are required by law to report* to 
the Department the wages jjaid to all employees 
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at the time he files the first claim to be monetarily 
eligible for a second claim after the first benefit year 
ends. However, before benefits can be allowed on the 
second claim, the claimant who has received compe-
nsation during the first benefit year is required to 
have had work since the beginning of such year in 
order to qualify for compensation in his next benefit 
year. 
R475-4g-2. Successive Benefit Year 
A successive benefit year is not limited to a claim 
that begins the week following the last week of the 
original benefit year (transitional claim), but may 
affect any claimant who files a second claim. 
R475-4g-3. Subsequent Employment 
The elements of subsequent employment necessary 
to meet the requirements of this provision of the Act 
are: 
1. Insured Work 
The earnings must be in "covered employment * 
subject to a State or Federal unemployment insur-
ance program (including railroad employment) which 
can be used to establish monetary eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
2. The work must have been performed after the 
effective date of the original claim, but not necessa-
rily during the benefit year of the original claim. 
3. Actual services must have been performed, not 
just the establishment of covered wages attributable 
to a period of time subsequent to the effective date 
of the original claim such as vacation or severance 
pay. 
4. The covered earnings must be equal to at least 
six times the weekly benefit amount of the original or 
subsequent claim, whichever is lower. 
R475-4g-4. Period of Disqualification 
If the claimant meets the requirements of monetary 
eligibility under Section 35-4-4(f). he may establish 
a claim but benefits would be denied under this 
section from the effective date of the claim until the 
week in which the claimant provides proof of earn-
ings from subsequent employment as required to 
remove the disqualification. 
a. Exception to Disqualification 
The provisions of this section do not apply unless 
the claimant actually received compensation during 
the original benefit year. If the claimant never filed 
for a compensable week; was disqualified and no 
benefit checks were issued; or the original claim 
could be canceled under the Rules pertaining to 
Section 35-4-4(a), ,a disqualification under this 
section would not be assessed. 
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R475-5a. Voluntary Leaving 
R475-5a-L General Information 
R475-5t-2. Good Cause 
R475-5a-3. Equity and Good Conscience 
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a Spouse 
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Borden of Proof 
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge 
R475-5a-7. Examples of Specific Reasons for Separations 
R475-5a-S. Effective Date of Disqualification 
R475-5a-l. General Information 
Voluntarily leaving work means that the employee 
severed the employment relationship as contrasted to 
a separation initiated by the employer. This is true 
regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons 
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were for making the decision to leave the work. 
Voluntary leaving will include not only leaving exis-
ting work, but also the failure to return to work after 
a lay-off, suspension; or period of absence. Volu-
ntary leaving also includes failure to renew a contract 
as in the case of a school teacher or athlete. The Act 
requires two standards of consideration following a 
voluntary separation from employment: good cause 
and equity and good conscience. If the claimant fails 
to establish good cause for leaving work, unemplo-
yment insurance benefits will not be denied if a 
denial of benefits would be contrary to the equity 
and good conscience standard. It is necessary to 
assess the totality of the employment situation. 
Where there are mitigating circumstances it may not 
be equitable to deny benefits. 
R475-5a-2. Good Cause 
1. Good cause is established if continuance of the 
employment would have had an adverse effect on the 
claimant which could not be controlled or prevented 
and necessitated immediate severance of the emplo-
yment relationship, or if the work was illegal, or 
unsuitable new work. 
a. Adverse Effect on the Qaimant 
The separation must have been motivated by circ-
umstances which made continuance of the employ-
ment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficie-
ntly adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh the 
benefits of remaining employed. There must be a 
showing of actual or potential physical, mental, 
economic, personal or professional harm caused or 
aggravated by continuance in the employment. The 
claimant's reason(s) for belief of the consequences of 
remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary; 
substantial, not trifling. These circumstances must be 
applied as to the average individual, not the supers-
ensitive. 
b. Ability to Control or Prevent 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect 
on the claimant, good cause is not established if the 
claimant: 
(1) reasonably could have continued working while 
looking for other employment, or 
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have 
made it possible for him to preserve his job through 
approved leave, transfer, or adjustment to personal 
circumstances, etc. or, 
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circ-
umstances causing the hardship so the employer 
would have an opportunity to make adjustment 
which would alleviate the need to quit. An employee 
with grievances about his employment must show an 
effort to work out the problems with the employer 
unless such efforts would be futile. 
c. Illegal 
Good cause is established if the individual was 
required to violate State or Federal law or his legal 
rights were violated; provided the employer was 
aware of the violation and refused to comply with 
the law. 
d. Unsuitable New Work 
Good cause may also be established if a claimant 
left new work which after a short trial period is 
shown to be materially unsuitable for the claimant 
consistent with the requirements of the suitable work 
test in Section 35-4-5(cXl) and (2) of the-Act. The 
fact that a job was accepted does not, in and of 
itseifj make the job suitable. The longer a job is 
held, the more it tends to set the standard by which 
the suitability of the job is to be judged. After a 
reasonable period of time a contention that the quit 
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was motivated by unsuitability ot the job is no longer 
persuasive. 
R475-5a-3. Equity and Good Conscience 
When the circumstances of the quit were not suf-
ficiently compelling to justify an allowance of bene-
fits for good cause, but there were mitigating circu-
mstances, and a denial of benefits would be unreas-
onably harsh or an afront to fairness, benefits may 
be allowed under the provisions of equity and good 
conscience if all of the following- elements are 
present 
a. the decision is made m cooperation with the 
employer by giving the employer an opportunity to 
provide information; 
b. the claimant acted reasonably; 
c. a denial would be mconsistent with the mtent of 
the unemployment insurance program, and 
d. the claimant demonstrated a continued attach-
ment to the labor market. 
2. The elements of equity and good conscience are 
defined as follows. 
a. In Cooperation with the Employer 
In administering the unemployment insurance 
program, the mtent of the Department is to maintain 
a careful balance between claimants and employers 
and to make fairness the uppermost consideration. 
The employer is given an opportunity to provide 
information when the Department notifies him that a 
former employee has filed a claim for benefits. Such 
notice provides an opportunity to explain the reason 
for separation. The employer is also notified of any 
appeal with regard to the separation except as prov-
ided under Section 35-4-4<e). 
b. The Claimant Acted Reasonably 
Reasonable is defined as those actions which make 
the decision to quit logical, sensible or practical. The 
actions which might be acceptable for a member of a 
subculture are not the norm by which reasonableness 
is established. There must be mitigating circumsta-
nces which, although not compelling, may be consi-
dered as motivating a reasonable person to take 
similar action. 
c. Consistent with the Purposes of the Act 
The mtent of the Act is to temper the hardships 
associated with unemployment and to provide stabi-
lity for the economy by maintaining purchasing 
power, individual skills and a stable workforce. 
d. Continued Attachment to the Labor Market. 
The claimant establishes his continued attachment 
to the labor market by raking positive action(s) which 
could result m employment dunng the first week 
after leaving work and each week thereafter. Attac-
hment to the labor market is demonstrated by such 
actions as making contacts with prospective emplo-
yers, preparing resumes, developing job leads, etc. 
Such a work search should have been undertaken 
without instructions from the Department. Failure to 
show attachment to the labor market dunng the first 
week of unemployment may be allowed if it was not 
practical for the individual to seek work in circums-
tances such as: illness, hospitalization, incarceration, 
or for other reasons beyond the control of the clai-
mant provided a worksearch was commenced as soon 
as practical. 
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a 
Spouse 
1. An individual leaves work without good cause, 
regardless of the reason for the move, if he or she 
quit to move with, follow or join, a lawful wife or 
husband, to or in a new place of residence from 
which it is not practical to commute to the employ-
ment Even if such necessitous circumstances as the 
expense of maintaining two separate households, or 
the need to keep a family together, were factors in 
the decision to move, benefits cannot be allowed. 
The Utah Legislature has chosen not to insure this 
aspect of domestic life. The only exception to this 
provision is where a claimant quits to accompany a 
spouse who is compelled to move to a new locale for 
medical reasons which are beyond the control of the 
spouse. 
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Burden of Proof 
Since the claimant is the moving party in a volun-
tary separation, he is the best source of information 
with regard to the reasons for the quit. The claimant 
has the burden of proof and must show that he had 
"good cause" for quitting, or that he meets the req-
uirements for allowance under the equity and good 
conscience provision before benefits can be allowed. 
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge 
1. Refusal to Follow Instructions - Constructive 
Abandonment 
If the claimant knew his job would be forfeit upon 
failure to follow reasonable requests or instructions, 
but chose not to comply, the resultant separation was 
a quit, not a discharge. 
2. Leavmg Pnorto Effective Date of Termination 
a. When a worker leaves pnor to the date of an 
impending reduction in force, he will be considered 
to have quit. A worker has an obligation to remain 
on the job until the work is completed. Notice of an 
impending layoff is not good cause to leave in order 
to get a head start m searching for other work. 
However, the duration of available work may be a 
mitigating factor in determining good cause of equity 
and good conscience, depending upon the reason for 
the decision to quit. If it is determined that the clai-
mant is not disqualified under Section 35-4-5(a), 
benefits shall be demed under Section 35-4-4(c) 
for the limited period of tune the claimant had been 
told by the employer that he could have continued 
working, as he failed to accept all available, suitable 
work for such weeks. 
b. An individual cannot escape a disqualification 
under Section 35-4-5(b)(l) by quitting in advance 
of a virtually certain discharge which would result in 
a denial of benefits. Such a separation shall be 
treated as a discharge. 
3. Leavmg Work Because of a Disciplinary Action 
If the disciplinary action or suspension is reason-
able and non-discnminatory, leavmg work rather 
than submit to such actions, or failing to return to 
work at the end of the suspension, is considered to 
be a voluntary quit without good cause unless the 
claimant was previously disqualified under the pro-
visions of Section 35-4-5(bXl). 
4. Failure to Return at the End of a Leave of 
Absence 
When a claimant takes a leave of absence for any 
reason and files a claim while still on leave from his 
employer, he will be considered "unemployed" even 
though he still has an attachment to the employer. 
However, his reason for taking the leave of absence 
will determine if he had good cause for quitting. If 
the claimant fails to return to work at the end of the 
leave of absence, this is also considered a voluntary 
quit which must result in a denial of benefits if the 
claimant cannot show good cause or that a denial 
would be contrary to equity and good conscience. 
5. Leavmg Due to a Remark or Action of the 
Employer or a Co-Worker 
When a worker interprets remarks of co-workers 
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or supervisors to mean he is to be discharged, the 
claimant has the responsibility to assure himseif, j 
prior to leaving that the employer intended to term-
inate the employment relationship and to continue 
working until the date of the discharge. If he fails to 
do so, or was not to be discharged, he left work 
voluntarily. 
6. Resignation intended — 
a. When a worker submits his resignation to be 
effective at some definite future date, but is discha-
rged prior to that date, the leaving is involuntary 
because the immediate cause of the separation is the 
result of the employer's action. However, the worker 
who states that he is quitting, but agrees to continue 
working, for an indefinite period of time and will 
leave at the convenience of the employer, leaves 
voluntarily even though the date of separation is 
determined by the employer. 
b. When a worker resigns and later changes his 
mind and attempts to remain employed, the reason-
ableness of the employer's refusal to continue the 
employment is the determining factor in deciding if 
the'claimant quit or was discharged. For example: if 
the employer had already hired a replacement, or 
taken other action because of the claimant's impen-
ding quit, it may not be practical for the employer to 
allow the claimant to withdraw his resignation and it 
would be held that the separation was voluntary. 
R475-5a-7. Examples of Specific Reasons for 
Separations 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
good cause or equity and good conscience must be 
considered in determining eligibility for benefits. The 
following examples do not include all reasons for 
leaving employment. 
I. Prospects of Other Work 
Good cause is established if at the time of separa-
tion the claimant had a definite and immediate ass-
urance of another job or self-employment that was 
reasonably expected to be full-time and permanent. 
Occasionally, after giving notice, but prior to leaving 
the first job, the individual learns that the new job 
will not be: available when promised, permanent, full-
time, or otherwise suitable. Good cause is established 
in such circumstances if the claimant immediately 
attempted, unless such an attempt was obviously 
futile, to rescind his notice of impending quit and | 
continue working. with his current employer* 
However,1 if it is apparent the claimant knew, or 
should have known, about the unsuitability of the 
new work, but quits the first job and subsequently 
also leaves the new job, a disqualification will apply 
from the time the claimant quit the first job. 
- a. A definite assurance of another job means that 
the claimant has personally been in contact with 
someone in authority to hire, been given a definite 
date to begin working and told under what condit-
ions he will be hired. If he has been told of a possi-
bility of a job opening and to report at the job site 
this circumstance implies only that he will be consi- I 
dered for hire, not a definite assurance of hire. Mere 
rumors of job openings are not job offers. Prospects 
of other work developed after leaving are relevant 
only in. showing a genuine attachent to the labor 
force. 
b. An immediate assurance of another job means 
that the prospective job will begin within two weeks, 
barring necessitous circumstances, of the last day of 
work on the job he is leaving. Benefits would be 
denied under the provisions of Section 35-4-4(c) if 
the claimant files during the interim between the two 
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jobs. If the job is to begin at a future date which is 
tentative and dependent on circumstances which 
cannot be definitely predicted, the claimant does not 
have good cause for leaving work. 
2. Pan-time Work and Reduction of Hours 
a. The reduction of an employee's working hours 
alone is not good cause for leaving the job. A reas-
onable person will remain partially employed as 
opposed to severing the relationship with the empl-
oyer. If the claimant is earning less than his weekly 
benefit amount, he could receive a partial unemplo-
yment insurance check even though he has not been 
separated from the employer. In extreme cases, 
however, a reduction of hours may be so detrimental 
to the employee that the circumstances justify 
leaving. All of the following elements are necessary 
to establish good cause for quitting without first 
obtaining other employment: 
(1) The reduction involves a substantial number of 
hours in proportion to the number of hours normally 
worked. 
(2) The reduction is permanent or expected to be 
of a long duration. 
(3) The reduction in hours causes a serious finan-
cial burden, or adverse effect on personal circumst-
ances such as transportation, chiidcare, etc., resulting 
in a real hardship and the claimant could not make 
reasonable adjustments to his personal circumstances 
prior to quitting. 
(4) The claimant was not advised at the time he 
was hired that a reduction of hours was possible or 
pending or the reduction in the hours was not a 
customary and known condition of the job as in the 
case of school employees or seasonal workers. 
(5) The reduction was not at the request of the 
claimant, was beyond the claimant's control, and the 
claimant attempted in good faith to avoid the redu-
ction in hours (except where such an attempt was 
clearly futile) by discussing the circumstances with 
the employer and accepting all work which was rea-
sonably available. 
b. If any of the foregoing five elements are not 
present and good cause cannot be shown, the provi-
sions of equity and good conscience may apply where 
there are mitigating circumstances or the reduction in 
hours was substantially unfair to the claimant. Miti-
gating circumstances include such things as: (I) pro-
spects of full-time work exist, but cannot be 
pursued while continuing to work- part-time; (2) the 
employer failed to comply with prior representations 
he made to the claimant; (3) the claimant made prior 
concessions for the benefit of the employer such as 
specialized training, relocation, etc.; (4) the reduction 
in hours was not equitably distributed or based on a 
rational basis, such as seniority or job requirements. 
3. Personal Circumstances 
There may be personal circumstances which are 
sufficiently compelling or create sufficient hardship 
to justify leaving work, provided the individual made 
reasonable attempts to make adjustments or find 
alternatives. 
4. Leaving to Attend School 
Leaving work to attend school might be justified 
on general principles but is not good cause for bec-
oming unemployed within the meaning of the Act. 
5. Conscientious Objection 
For religious concerns to establish good cause for 
quitting there must be .evidence that the effects of 
continuing work would conflict with good faith, 
honestly held religious convictions. This does not 
necessarily mean that any personal belief, no matter 
how unique, is entitled to this protection. "However, 
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beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others or shared by all members 
of a religious sea in order to be good faith religious 
convictions. Where the individual was not called 
upon, as a condition of his employment, to violate 
his religious beliefs, he is not compelled to quit. A 
general abhorrence of war does not show a compel-
ling need to quit work at an armory nor does mem-
bership in a religion which counsels ^against the use 
of alcohol preclude employment in a grocery store or 
restaurant where alcoholic beverages are sold. A 
decision not to continue working under conditions 
which conflict with convictions does not justify 
leaving work unless there is evidence of a good faith 
change in personal convictions as shown by a change 
in lifestyle. However, a change in the job requiring 
work in conflict with personal or religious convict-
ions is good cause for leaving if the claimant has not 
previously worked under such conditions and the 
employer will not make adjustments. 
6. Distance 
An employee has the responsibility to arrange 
transportation to and from work within normal 
commuting patterns, unless it is customary in that 
job or occupation for the employer to provide tran-
sportation. When lack of transportation, beyond the 
control of the individual, prevents continuance of the 
work, good cause may be established provided the 
claimant has no other alternate means of transport-
ation. An individual's preference for a discontinued 
mode of transportation to a substantially equal one is 
not good cause. The mere inconvenience of one kind 
of transportation as compared with another should 
not be confused with hardship. When a change in 
residence results in an increased distance to work 
beyond normal commuting patterns, the reason for 
the move, not the distance to the work, is the factor 
which determines if the claimant quit with good 
cause. 
7. Marriage 
a. When an individual leaves work to be married, 
such a personal choice is not good cause for quitting, 
even if the intended residence of the couple was too 
far for the claimant to commute to the work. 
b. When the employer has a rule that requires 
separation of an employee who marries a co-
worker, the separation is involuntary even though the 
employer may leave it to the couple to decide who 
will leave. 
8. Health or Physical Condition 
a. A worker generally consults a physician prior to 
quitting to determine if the job was actually a factor 
contributing to the health problem. Although it is 
not essential for the claimant to have been advised by 
a physician to quit, a contention that health prob-
lems required the separation must be established by 
competent evidence. Even if the work causes or 
aggravates a health problem, if there are alternatives, 
such as treatment or medication, or the conditions of 
the work can be changed to alleviate the problem, 
good cause for quitting is not established. 
b. "Leaving work because of an employer's failure 
to comply with government regulations concerning 
health and safety is good cause provided the empl-
oyer was told of the problem and did not take corr-
ective action. The degree of risk to health and safety 
must be substantial before leaving could be consid-
ered good cause. 
c. Some conditions of work, although meeting 
government safety and health standards, may present 
an undue risk to a particular worker because of 
unique personal conditions. Allergy is one example 
rity/Job Service R475-5a-7 
of unique circumstances that might require a job 
change or adjustment. However, if the risk to health 
or safety is one home by all those employed in the 
occupation and the claimant fails to show he was 
affected to a greater extent than the other workers in 
the same occupation, good cause for leaving is not 
established. A fear of potential health and safety 
problems is not good cause for quitting unless the 
claimant can show that the fear is justified. 
d. Pregnancy is treated as any other temporary 
disability. Employers generally provide maternity 
leave if leave is provided for other medical disabili-
ties. If leave is available, the claimant voluntarily 
quits by failing to accept or arrange leave or failing 
to return at the end of the leave. 
9. Retirement and Pension 
Leaving work solely to accept retirement benefits is 
not a compelling reason for quitting. Although it 
may be reasonable for an individual to take advan-
tage of a retirement benefit, payment of unemploy-
ment benefits in such a circumstance would not be 
consistent with the intent of the Unemployment Ins-
urance program, and, therefore, a denial of benefits 
would not be contrary to equity and good consci-
ence. However, if the employer required the empl-
oyee to leave work at a certain age, or after an est-
ablished number of years, the separation was invol-
untary. 
10. Sexual Harassment 
a. A claimant may have good cause for leaving if 
the quit was due to chscriminatory and unlawful 
sexual harassment, provided the employer was given 
a chance to take necessary action to alleviate the 
objectionable conduct. Sexual harassment is a form 
of sex Qjscrirnination which is prohibited by Title VII 
of the U. S. Civil Rights Act. Sexual harassment is 
intimidation by a person of either sex against a 
person of the opposite or same sex. For sexual har-
assment to be discriminatory, the following three 
elements must be shown to exist: 
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a 
sexual nature which adversely affects a person's 
employment relationship or working environment, if: 
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit 
or implicit term or condition of employment, or 
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is 
used as a basis for an employment decision affecting 
the person, or 
(c) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substa-
ntially interfering with a person's work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment, 
(2) Unsolicited, deliberately sexual statements, 
gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable 
to the recipient, 
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace, 
destroys morale and offends legal and social stand-
ards of acceptable behavior. 
b. Inappropriate behavior which, has sexual conn-
otation but does not meet the test of sexual discrim-
ination is insufficient to establish good cause for 
leaving work. 
11. Discrimination 
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive an individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an empl-
oyee because of the individual's race, color, religion, 
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sex or national ongin. 
R475-5a-$. Effective Date of Disqualification 
1. The disqualification under this section technic-
ally begins with the week the claimant voluntarily 
quit the job. However, to avoid the confusion which 
arises when a disqualification is made for a period of 
time prior to the filing of a claim, the claimant will 
be notified that benefits are denied beginning with 
the effective date of a new or reopened claim. The 
disqualification continues until the claimant returns 
to work in a bona fide covered employment and 
earns six times his weekly benefit amount after the 
week in which the claimant left work. A disqualific-
ation which begins in one benefit year will continue 
into a new benefit year unless purged by subsequent 
earnings. 
2. If an individual is receiving remuneration which 
is attributed to a period of time following the last 
day of work, such as severance or vacation pay, the 
"week in which the claimant left work" is considered 
to be the last week for which such remuneration was 
attributable as an individual is not ''unemployed * 
while receiving remuneration from an" employer, and 
such severance- or vacation pay cannot be used to 
purge a disqualification. 
1987 35-4-5« 
R475-5b. Discharge and Discharge for 
Crime 
R475-5b-l. Discharge 
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime 
R475-5b-l. Discharge 
I. General Definition 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in 
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the 
"just cause" provisions of the Act. Just cause is 
defined as a job separation that is necessary due to 
the seriousness of actual or potential harm to the 
employer provided the claimant had knowledge of 
the employer's expectations and had control over the 
circumstances which led to the discharge. Just cause 
is not established if the reason for the discharge is 
baseless, arbitrary or capricious or the employer has 
failed to uniformly
 t apply reasonable standards to all 
employees when instituting disciplinary action. The 
purpose of this section is to deny benefits to indivi-
duals who bring about their own unemployment by 
,. conducting themselves, with respect to their emplo-
yment with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of 
consideration to such a degree that the employer, was 
justified in discharging the employee. However, when 
an employee is discharged by his employer," such 
discharge may have been the result of incompetence, 
lack of skill, or other reasons which are beyond the 
claimant's control. The question which must be est-
ablished by the evidence is whether the claimant is "at 
fault in his resulting unemployment.^ Unemployment 
insurance benefits will be denied if the employer had 
just cause for discharging the employee. However, 
not every cause for discharge provides a basis to 
deny benefits. In order to have just cause for disch-
arge pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) .there must 
be some fault on the part of the employee involved. 
II. Just Cause. 
J. The basic factors which establish just cause, and' 
are essential for a determination of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or, the seve-
rity, of the offense as it.affects continuance of the I 
| employment relationship. The discharge must have 
been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
the employer's rightful interests. A discharge would 
I not be considered " necessary * if it is not consistent 
with reasonable employment practices. The wrong-
ness of the conduct must be considered in the context 
of the particular employment and how it affects the 
employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there is no expecta-
tion that the conduct will be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is 
not necessary to discharge the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important 
in determining if the act or omission is an isolated 
incident or a. good faith error in judgment. An 
employee who has historically complied with work 
rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm 
to the employer. For example: A long term employee 
who does not have a history of tardiness or absent-
eeism is absent without leave for a number of days 
due to a death in his immediate family. Although 
this is a violation of the employer's rules and may 
establish just cause for discharging a new employee, 
the fact that the employee has established over a long 
period of time that he complies with attendance rules 
shows that the circumstance is more of an isolated 
incident rather than a violation of the rales that is or 
could be expected to be habitual. In this case because 
the potential for harm to the employer is not shown, 
it is not necessary for the employer to discharge the 
employee, and therefore just cause is not established, 
b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the 
'conduct which the employer expected. It is not nec-
essary that the claimant intended to cause harm to 
the employer, but he should reasonably have been 
able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the empl-
oyer gave a clear, explanation of the expected beha-
vior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the 
case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear, 
ambiguous- or inconsistent, the existence of knowl-
edge is not shown. A specific warning is one way of 
showing that - the employee had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After the employee is given-a 
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional violations - occur-
ring- after the warning would be necessary to establish 
just cause for a discharge. 
(1) For Example: When the employer has an esta-
blished procedure of progressive discipline,- such 
procedures generally must have been followed in 
order to establish that the employee had knowledge 
of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the 
act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such 
as criminal actions, may justify immediate discharge 
without following a progressive disciplinary program. 
c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power, and 
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent*. 
2. Just cause may not be established when the 
reason for discharge is based on such things as mere 
mistakes, inefficiencyr failure, of performance as the 
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in iso-
lated instances, good faith errors in judgment or in 
the exercise, of discretion,, minor but casual or unin-
tentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These, exa-
mples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the 
lack of knowledge or control. However,- continued 
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inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care 
exercised by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar 
circumstances, may be disqualifying depending on 
the reason and degree of the carelessness, the know-
ledge and control of the employee. 
3. The term ''just cause* as used in Section 5(b)(1) 
does not lessen the requirement that there be some 
fault on the part of the employee mvolved. Prior to 
the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Com-
mission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an int-
entional infliction of harm or intentional disregard of 
the employer's interests. The intent of the Legisla-
ture in adding the words 'just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive int-
erpretation. While some fault must be present, it is 
sufficient that the acts were intended, the conseque-
nces were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts 
have serious effect on. the employee's job or the 
employer's interests. 
III. Burden of Proof 
1. In a discharge, the employer initiates the sepa-
ration and, as such, is the primary source of infor-
mation with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. 
The employer has the burden of proof which is the 
responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the 
discharge. The employer is required by the Statute in 
Section 35-4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to 
provide correct information to the Department for 
proper administration of the Act. Although the 
employer has the burden to establish just cause for 
the discharge, if sufficient facts are obtained from 
the claimant, a decision will be made based on the 
information available. The failure of one party to 
provide information does not necessarily result in a 
ruling favorable to the other party 
2. All interested parties have the right to give reb-
uttal to information contrary to the interests of that 
party 
IV. Quit or Discharge 
The determination of whether a separation is a 
quit or a discharge is made by the Department based 
on the circumstances which resulted in the separa-
tion. The conclusions on the employer's records, the 
separation notice or the claimant's report are not 
controlling on the Department. 
1. Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation 
When an individual notifies an employer that he 
intends to leave as of a definite date in the future 
and is discharged prior to that date, the cause for the 
separation on the day the separation takes place is 
the controlling factor in determining whether it was a 
quit or discharge. Although the separation might 
have been motivated by the claimant's announced 
resignation* the employer was the moving party in 
ending the employment prior to the resignation date. 
Therefore, the immediate reason was more closely 
related to the employer's action than to the clai-
mant's announced intention to quit. Unless disqual-
ifying conduct is mvolved, the separation is consid-
ered to be for the convenience of the employer. 
However, if the employee is merely relieved of work, 
responsibilities but is paid through the date of his 
announced resignation, it is not a discharge, but a 
quit. 
2. Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge 
When an employee leaves work m anticipation of a 
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the 
discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation 
is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. 
However, an individual who leaves work to avoid 
virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct 
cannot thereby avoid the disquahfying provisions of 
Section 35-4-5(b), and the separation is considered 
a discharge rather than voluntary leaving 
3 Employee Knows His Action will Result in 
Discharge 
Absence taken without permission, or other actions 
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from the 
employer, are generally considered a voluntary sep-
aration rather than discharge, if the worker was 
given a choice of complying or being separated 
V Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary Furl-
ough 
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspe-
nsion or involuntary furlough, he may meet the 
definition of "unemployed" If the claimant files 
during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the 
suspension or furlough must be adjudicated as a 
discharge, even though the claimant is still attached 
to the employer and expects to return to work. A 
suspension which was reasonable and necessary to 
prevent potential harm to the employer or to main-
tain necessary discipline would generally result in a 
disqualification under this section provided the ele-
ments of control and knowledge are present Failure 
to return to work at the the end of the definite 
period of suspension or furlough would be consid-
ered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be 
determined consistent with Section 35-4-5(a), if 
the claimant had not been previously denied 
VI. Proximal Cause - Relation of Offenses to 
Discharge 
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which 
motivates the employer to make the decision to ter-
minate the employee's services If the decision has 
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated by way 
of notice to the employee or the initiation of a pers-
onnel action. Although the employer may learn of 
other offenses following the making of the decision 
to terminate, the reason for the discharge is limited 
to that conduct of which the employer was aware 
prior to making the decision. However, if the empl-
oyer discharges a person because of some preliminary 
evidence of certain conduct, but does not obtain all 
of the proof of the conduct until after the separation 
notice is given, it could still be concluded that the 
discharge was caused by that conduct which the 
employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits 
will then be determined, by considering the extent of 
culpability, knowledge and control. 
2. When the discharge does not occur immediately 
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a 
presumption arises that there were other reasons for 
the discharge. This relationship between the offense 
and the discharge must be established both as to 
cause and tune. The presumption that the conduct 
was not the cause of the discharge may-'be overcome 
by a showing that the delay was due to such things as 
investigation, arbitration, or hearings conducted with 
regard to the employee's conduct. When a grievance 
or arbitration is pending with respect to the disch-
arge, the Department's decision will be based on the 
information available to the Department. The Dep-
artment's decision is not binding on the grievance 
resolution process or an arbitrator and the decision 
of the arbitrator is not binding On the Department. 
When an employer is faced with the necessity of a 
reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's 
prior conduct as the criteria for determining who- will 
be laid off,* the lack of work is the primary motiva-
tion or cause of the discharge, not the conduct. 
VII. In Connection with Employment 
Disquahfying conduct is not limited to offenses 
which take place on the employer's premises or 
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during business hours It is only necessary that the 
conduct have such "connection" to the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business that it is a 
subject of legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer All employers, both public and private 
have the right to expect employees to refrain from 
acts which are detrimental to the busmess or would 
bring dishonor on the busmess name or the institu-
tion. Legitimate interests of employers include, but 
are not limited to. goodwill of customers, reputation 
of the busmess, efficiency, busmess costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty 
VIII. Examples of Reasons for Discharge 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
just cause must be considered in determining eligibi-
lity for benefits. The following examples do not 
mclude all reasons for discharge. 
1. Violation of Company Rules 
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the 
employer and the three elements of culpability, 
knowledge and control are established, benefits must 
be denied. 
a. The reasonableness of the employer's rules will 
depend on the necessity for such a rule as it affects 
the employer's interests Rules which are contrary to 
general public policy or which infringe upon the 
recognized rights and privileges of individuals may 
not be reasonable. An employer must have broader 
prerogatives in regulating conduct when employees 
are on the job than when they are not. An employer 
must be able to make rules for employee on-the-
job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate 
busmess interests of the employer An employer is 
not required to impose only minimum standards, but 
there may be some justifiable cause for violations of 
rules that are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous 
or exacting. When rules are changed, adequate notice 
and reasonable opportunity to comply must be aff-
orded. If the employee believes a rule is unreason-
able, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns 
with the employer and give the employer an opport-
unity to take corrective action 
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment 
contract or collective bargaining agreement. Just 
cause for the discharge is not established if the 
employee's conduct was consistent with his rights 
under such contract or the discharge was contrary to 
the provisions of such contract. 
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying 
conduct if it is found that the act was condoned by 
the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary 
However, when the worker is given notice that the 
conduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations 
could result m a denial of benefits. 
d. Culpability may be established even if the result 
of the violation of the rule does not m and of itself 
cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of 
compliance with rules diminishes the employer's 
ability to have order and control. Culpability is est-
ablished if termination of the employee was required 
to maintain necessary discipline in the company. 
e. Knowledge of the employer's standards of 
behavior is usually provided in the form of verbal 
instructions, written rules and/or warnings. 
However, the warning is not always necessary for a 
disqualification to apply in cases of violations-of a 
serious nature of universal standards of conduct of 
which the claimant should have been aware without 
being warned. 
2. Attendance Violations 
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and 
remain at work within the reasonable requirements of 
the employer Discharge for unjustified absence or 
tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker 
knows that he is violating attendance rules Such 
violations are generally a serious matter of concern 
to employers as attendance standards are necessary to 
maintain order, control, and productivity Discharge 
for an attendance violation beyond the control of the 
worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reaso-
nably could have given notice or obtained permission 
consistent with the employer's rules 
b In cases of termination for violations of atten-
dance standards, the employee's recent history of 
attendance shall be considered to determine if the 
violation is an isolated incident, or demonstrates a 
pattern of unjustified absences within the control of 
the employee Flagrant misuse of attendance privil-
eges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last 
incident was beyond the employee's control 
3 Falsification of Work Record 
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/ 
employer relationship A statement made in an app-
lication for a job may be considered as connected 
with the work, even though it is made before the 
work begins An individual begins his obligations as 
am employee when he makes an application for work 
One of those obligations is to give the employer 
truthful answers to all material questions Any fals-
ification of information which may operate to expose 
the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage 
would be considered material and therefore may 
establish culpability If the claimant made a false 
statement while applying for work in order to be 
hired, benefits may be denied even if the claimant 
would have otherwise remained unemployed and 
eligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits 
dependmg upon the degree of knowledge, culpability 
and control 
4 Insubordination 
Authority is required in the work place to maintain 
order and efficiency An employer has the right to 
expect that lines of authority will be maintained, that 
reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be 
obeyed; that supervisors will be respected and that 
then- authority will not be undermined. In determi-
ning when insubordination (resistance to authority) 
becomes disqualifying conduct, the fact that there 
was a disregard of the employer's mterests is the 
major importance Mere protests or dissatisfaction 
without an overt act is not in disregard of the empl-
oyer's mterests. However, provocative remarks to a 
superior or vulgar or profane language m response to 
a civil request may be insubordination if it is cond-
ucive to disruption of routine, negation Of authority 
and impairment of efficiency Mere incompatibility 
or emphatic insistence or discussion by an employee 
who was acting in good faith is not disqualifying 
conduct 
5 Loss of License 
When an employee loses a license which he knows 
is required for the performance of the job, and the 
individual had control over the circumstances which, 
resulted in the loss of the license, such conduct is 
disqualifying. For example, if the claimant worked as 
a driver, and lost his license because of a conviction 
for driving under the influence (DUI), culpability is 
established if he fails to obtain a permit to drive at 
work or the conviction would expose the employer to 
additional liabilities. The employer cannot authorize 
an employee to drive in violation of the law. Also, 
additional insurance costs or other liabilities* are a 
legitimate concern of the employer ~»Knowledge is 
established because it is a matter of common know-
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ledge in the State of Utah that driving under the 
influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and is 
punishable by loss of the individual's dnving privil-
eges. Judicial notice can be taken of this fact because 
a question relative to this matter is on every driver's 
license test. He had control in that he made a cons-
cious decision to risk loss of the license when he 
failed to make arrangements for transportation prior 
to becoming under the influence of intoxicants. 
IX. Effective Date of Disqualification 
The Act provides that any disqualification under 
this section will include "the week in which the clai-
mant was discharged . . . " However, to avoid conf-
usion, the denial of benefits will begm with the 
Sunday of the week for which claimant has filed for 
benefits. 
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime 
I. General Definition. 
1. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law; 
an offense against the State or the United States. 
"Crime" and "Misdemeanor" are synonymous terms; 
though in common usage crime is used to denote 
offenses of a more serious nature. However, for 
example: an insignificant, although illegal act, or the 
taking of something which is of little or no value, or 
believed to have been abandoned may not be suffic-
ient to establish that a crime was committed as 
defined for the application of this section of the Act, 
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation 
of the law. 
2. The duty of honesty is implied in any employ-
ment relationship. A worker is obligated to deal with 
his employer in truthfulness and good faith. An 
individual discharged for dishonesty constituting a 
crime connected with his work is at fault in his res-
ulting unemployment. The 52 week disqualification 
for "dishonesty constituting a crime" required by the 
statute is a mandatory penalty. 
3. The basic factors which are essential for a dis-
qualification under this provision of the law are that 
the individual was discharged for a crime that was: 
a. In connection with work 
b. Dishonesty 
c. Admitted or established by a conviction in a 
court of law 
II. In Connection with Work 
The connection to the work is not limited to offe-
nses which take place on the employer's premises or 
during business hours. The employer does not have 
to be the victim of the crime, but the crime must 
adversely affect the employer's rightful interest. It is 
necessary that the conduct have a "connection* to 
the employee's duties and to the employer's business 
that it is a subject of legitimate and significant 
concern. All employers, both public and private, 
have the right to expect employees to refrain from 
acts which are detrimental to the business or would 
bring dishonor on the business name of the institu-
tion. Legitimate interests of employers include, but 
are not limited to: goodwill of customers, reputation 
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty. 
III. Dishonesty 
Dishonesty in this context generally means- theft 
but may also include other criminal acts connected 
with the work that render the employee untrustwo-
rthy or show a lack of integrity. Dishonesty not 
involving^a crime "may still be disqualifying under 
provisions of Section 5(b)(1). 
IV. Admission or Conviction in a Court 
1. An admission is a voluntary acknowledgement 
CODE«CO 
Prow. UtaJi 
made by a claimant that he has committed acts which 
are in violation of the law. In this context, the 
admission may be a verbal or written statement by 
the claimant that he committed the act. The admis-
sion does not necessarily have to be made to a Dep-
artment representative. However, there must be suf-
ficient information to establish that it was not a. false 
statement given under duress or made to obtain some 
concession. 
2. A conviction is when a claimant has been found 
guilty by a court of committing acts which are in 
violation of the law. When the claimant pleads "no 
contest" or agrees to the diversionary program as 
provided by the court, this is treated, for'the purp-
oses of this section of the Act, the same as a convi-
ction and benefits will be denied. 
V. Benefits Held in Abeyance 
1. If the claimant has not made an admission, but 
is held in legal custody or free on bail, the law req-
uires a withholding of a determination of eligibility. 
Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of 
eligibility is made. Failure to pay benefits even 
though the burden of proof for a denial under 
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because 
the court, in holding the claimant in legal custody or 
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that 
the state has established that a crime has been com-
mitted and there is reason to believe the individual 
committed that crime. The filing of charges is not the 
same as being held in custody. 
2. However, if there is a preponderance of evid-
ence that the act was committed, a denial of benefits 
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if 
charges have not been filed by the employer within 
four weeks. In such a case, the decision under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a 
decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is still' pending 
and the 5(b)(1) disqualification shall be changed to a 
5(b)(2) disqualification if the claimant is found guilty 
by the court. If the claimant has purged a. 5(b)(1) 
disqualification which was or could be assessed 
pending a ruling by the court, benefits must be held 
in abeyance until the court reaches the verdict. The 
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Depa-
rtment with the court's verdict in order to establish 
eligibility. 
3. If a determination of eligibility is held in abey-
ance the claimant must be notified in a written deci-
sion that benefits are being withheld in accordance 
with Section 35-4-5(b)(2) pending a determination 
by the court. 
1987 35-4-5b2.35-4.5bl 
R475-5c. Failure to Apply for or Accept 
Suitable Work 
R475-5c-l. General Definition 
R475-5c-2. Elements Necessary for an Issue 
R475-5c-3. Provisions for Allowance of Benefits After 
an Issue is Found to Exist 
R475-5c-4. Failure to Accept a Referral 
R475-5c-5. Proper Application 
R475-5c-6. Failure to Accept an Offer of Work 
R475-5c-7. Good Cause 
R475-5C-*. Equity and Good Conscience 
R475-5c-9. Suitability of Work 
R475-5c-10. Examples 
R475-5c-ll. New Work 
R475-5c-12~ Burden of Proof 
R475-5c-U. Period of Ineiitibfliry 
R475-5c-14. Notification 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Workmen's compensation or the occupa- Plaintiff may qualify under the statute for 
tional disease laws." the freezing of the base period where the bene-
"Workmen's compensation or the occupa- fits received were federal social security bene-
tional disease laws" modifies only ''this state" fits if the benefits were received as compensa-
and not "federal law" in this section. DeLuca v. tion for sickness or illness. DeLuca v. Depart-
Department of Emp. Sec, 746 P.2d 276 (Utah ment of Emp. Sec, 746 P.2d 276 (Utah Ct. App. 
Ct. App. 1987). 1987). 
35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employ-
ment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibil-
ity for benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a 
nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for 
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who 
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsec-
tion. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and ad-
verse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commis-
sion, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal 
to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona 
fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty consti-
tuting a crime in connection with his work as shown by the facts 
together with his admission, or as shown by his conviction in a court 
of competent jurisdiction of a crime in connection with that dishon-
esty and for the 51 next following weeks. If by reason of his alleged 
dishonesty in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal 
custody or is free on bail, any determination of his eligibility shall be 
held in abeyance pending his release or conviction. 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant has failed without good 
cause to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to 
suitable work offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work 
offered by an employer or the employment office. The ineligibility con-
tinues until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for the services in an amount equal to at 
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least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall 
not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or 
accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that 
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualifi-
cation. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the reason-
ableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reach-
ing a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary 
to equity and good conscience. 
(1) In determining whether or not work is suitable for an individ-
ual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his 
health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his 
prior earnings and experience, his length of unemployment and pros-
pects for securing local work in his customary occupation, the wages 
for similar work in the locality, and the distance of the available 
work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters 
used in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the 
most recent employer. The commission shall be more prone to find 
work as suitable the longer the claimant has been unemployed and 
the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his customary 
occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is 
suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any 
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under 
any of the following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, 
lockout, or other labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered 
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those pre-
vailing for similar work in the locality; 
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would 
be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain 
from joining any bona fide labor organization, 
(d) For any week in which the commission finds that his unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involv-
ing his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at 
which he is or was last employed. 
(1) If the commission finds that a strike has been fomented by a 
worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or 
group of workers of the individual who is found to be a party to the 
plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits. 
However, if the commission finds that the strike is caused by the 
failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any 
law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike shall not render the 
workers ineligible for benefits. 
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or repre-
sentative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his workers, 
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their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike shall 
not render the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemploy-
ment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has obtained 
employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount 
specified in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as specified in Sub-
section 35-4-4(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to 
this strike the wages of the worker used for the determination of his 
benefit rights shall not include any wages he earned from the em-
ployer involved in the strike. 
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a 
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material 
fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions of this act, and an addi-
tional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or representation was 
made or fact withheld and six weeks for each week thereafter; the addi-
tional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period shall com-
mence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination finding 
the claimant in violation of this subsection. Each individual found in 
violation of this subsection shall repay to the commission the amount of 
benefits the claimant actually received and, as a civil penalty, an amount 
equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud. 
The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this 
chapter. These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in 
the manner provided in Subsections 35-4-17(c) and (e). A claimant is 
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if any amount owed 
under this subsection remains unpaid. 
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn 
written admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hear-
ing. If a claimant waives the recorded hearing, a determination shall be 
made based upon all the facts which the commission, exercising due dili-
gence, has obtained. Determinations by the commission are appealable in 
the manner provided by this act for appeals from other benefit determina-
tions. 
(f) For any week with respect to which or a part of which he has re-
ceived or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment 
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate 
agency of the other state or of the United States finally determines that 
he is not entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification 
does not apply. 
(g) (1) For any week in which he is registered at and attending an 
established school, or is on vacation during or between successive 
quarters or semesters of school attendance, unless the major portion 
of his wages for insured work during his base period was for services 
performed while attending school. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
provisions of this subsection, an otherwise eligible individual is not 
ineligible to receive benefits while attending a part-time training 
course. An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits 
for any week because he is in training with the approval of the com-
mission, and that individual is not ineligible to receive benefits by 
reason of nonavailability for work, failure to search for work, refusal 
of suitable work, or failure to apply for or to accept suitable work 
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with respect to any week he is in training with the approval of the 
commission. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no other-
wise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because 
he is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 
1974, nor shall he be denied benefits for leaving work to enter that 
training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or be-
cause of the application to any such week in training of provisions in 
this law or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law 
relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to 
accept work. 
For purposes of this subsection, "suitable employment" means work of a 
substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual's past 
adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act 
of 1974, and wages for that work at not less than 80% of the individual's 
average weeklv wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 
1974. 
(h) For any week with respect to which he is receiving, has received, or 
is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of: 
(1) wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or 
(2) accrued vacation or terminal leave payment. 
If the remuneration is less than the benefits which would otherwise be 
due, he is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits 
reduced as provided in Subsection 35-4-3(c). 
(i) (1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or 
principal administrative capacity and which begins during the period 
between two successive academic years, or during a similar period 
between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a 
period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's con-
tract if the individual performs services in the first of those academic 
years or terms and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform services in any such capacity for an edu-
cational institution in the second of the academic years or terms. 
(2) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service in any other capacity for an educational institution, and 
which week begins during a period between two successive academic 
years or terms if the individual performs those services in the first of 
the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic 
years or terms. If compensation is denied to any individual under this 
subparagraph and the individual was not offered an opportunity to 
perform such services for the educational institution for the second of 
such academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a 
retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which the 
individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which com-
pensation was denied solely by reason of this subparagraph. 
(3) With respect to any services described in Subsections (i)(l) or 
(2), compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be de-
nied to an individual for any week which commences during an es-
tablished and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the indi-
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vidual performs the services in the period immediately before the 
vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance 
that the individual will perform the services in the period immedi-
ately following the vacation period or holiday recess. 
(4) With respect to services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2), 
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in 
Subsection (i)(l), (2), or (3) shall be denied to an individual who 
performed those services in an educational institution while in the 
employ of an educational service agency. For purposes of this Subsec-
tion (i)(4), "educational service agency" means a governmental 
agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose 
of providing the services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2) to an 
educational institution. 
Benefits based on service in employment defined in Subsections 
35-4-22(j)(2)(D) and (E) are payable in the same amount, on the same 
terms and subject to the same conditions as compensation payable on the 
basis of other service subject to this chapter. 
(j) For any week which commences during the period between two suc-
cessive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any 
services, substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or 
athletic events or training or preparing to participate in the first of those 
seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that indi-
vidual will perform those services in the later of the seasons or similar 
periods. 
(k) (1) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services 
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time the services 
were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the 
services or, was permanently residing in the United States under 
color of law at the time the services were performed, including an 
alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the 
application of Subsection 203(a)(7) or Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. 
(2) Any data or information required of individuals applying for 
benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them be-
cause of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all appli-
cants for benefits. 
(3) In the case of an individual whose application for benefits 
would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the 
individual are not payable because of his alien status shall be made 
except upon a preponderance of the evidence. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 5; C. 1943, tuted numbers for letters and vice versa as 
42-2a-5; L. 1949, ch. 53, § 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1; subsection designations; inserted "Subsection 
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1959, ch. 57, § 1; 1963, ch. (9)(a) or (b)" in each sentence of subsection 
52, § 1; 1971, ch. 78, § 4; 1971, ch. 79, § 1; (9)(b); substituted "Subsections (9)(a) or (b)" for 
1976, ch. 19, § 2; 1977 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 3; "clause (1) or (2)" in subsection (9)(c); inserted 
1979, ch. 137, § 3; 1982, ch. 78, § 4; 1983 (1st subsection (9)(d); and made minor changes in 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 3; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 18, § 1; phraseology, punctuation and style. 
1985, ch. 232, § 2; 1987, ch. 81, § 3; 1987, ch. The 1985 amendment redesignated the for-
92, § 49. merly numbered subsections as lettered sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 (2nd S.S.) sections, and vice versa; deleted bracketed sub-
amendment, effective April 6, 1984, substi- headings preceding each of Subsections (a) 
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Case No. 88-3S-085 
The employer, Morton Thiokol, appeals the decision of the Acz 
strative Law Judge in tne above-entitled matter which held that the clai 
had been discharged.from his employment with the empi Jonnscn, Kevin R. ..„ ^~ ..- -
 w.r.^ 
for reasons that are not disqualifying under §35--r3(b) (1 ] of tne 
Employment Security Act. The ALJ's decision therefore allowed paymen 
unemployment benefits to the claimant effective Oecember 
continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. The 
held the employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to S35-4-7(c) of 
Act. 
20, 1937 
ALJ's decision 
nant, 
'oyer 
Utan 
t of 
and 
also 
the 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review reverses the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and 
denies payment of benefits on the grounds the claimant was discharged from 
his employment for reasons that are disqualifying under §35-4-5(b)(l) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
In reversing the decision of the ALJ, the Soard of Review notes 
that , as in i ts prior decision in ?88-SR-31, involving the same employer, 
the employer's rule was reasonable and*-its application to the claimant was 
fair . After being involved in an accident the claimant was drug tested 
in accordance with company policy. The test results were positive. The 
company reviewed the situation and concluded that Mr. Johnson was not at 
fault in the accident and therefore did not terminate him even though the 
drug tes t results were positive. Rather, the employer referred the claimant 
to the employee assistance program for counselling. He was advised he was 
subject to random testing during the next 12 month period. On November 25, 
1987, 65 days after the initial positive test result, the claimant was 
selected for an 
marijuana use. additional drug testing. He again tested positive for 
The Board of Review finds the claimant's testimony that he did 
not use marijuana again after the first test to not be credible. Although, 
by his own admission the claimant continued to live in an environment where 
marijuana was illegally consumed on a daily basis by his roommates, the 
Board of Review does not agree that passive inhalation alone was sufficient 
to account for the positive results on the second tes t . 
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-?. 
Employers have a resoonsibility to ensure a safe wor.olace for 
their employees ana also to proauce products that are, insofar as possiole, 
free of hiaaen defects. This employer's drug policy and tne manner in 
wnicn it was applied promote those lauaiole oojeccives. This Boara will 
not undermine tncse objectives by allowing unemployment benefits to tnose 
wno have been discharged for violating an emoloyer's reasonaole policy or 
rule respecting tne use of illegal crugs. The employer is tnerercre 
relieved of benefit cnarges as provided by §35-i-7(c)(3)(F) of tne Utan 
Employment Security Act. 
This decision creates an overpayment in tne amount of 53,513.00. 
The claimant is not at fault in tne creation of this overpayment. There-
fore, tne claimant is not liaole to repay tne overpayment out is liaole 
to have it deducted from any future benefits payaole to him curing his 
current benefit year. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of nail-
ing hereof, and any furtner aopeai must be maae directly with tne Court of 
Appeals, Miatawn Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 4Q0, Salt Lake City, 
Utan, witnin ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an aopeai 
with tne Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Cler< of tne Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting fortn tne reasons for appeal, pursuant 
to §35-4-10(i) of the Utan Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief. 
Dated this 10th day of May, 1988-
Date Hailed: May 12, 1988.
 B0ARD 0F R£YrEW 
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S.S.A. No. 528-17-5731 : 
: Case No. 88-A-0353 
DECISION 
: Case No. 38-3R-086 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1988 and mailed May 12, 
1988, the Board of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, David 
Bert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its 
decision on the grounds that he was neyer notified of the employer's appeal and 
was not given an opportunity to submit written argument in favor of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to 
the claimant and was reversed by the 8oard of Review. Mr. Havas requested an 
oooortunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration. 
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review which 
has now received Mr. Havas' memorandum in support of affirmance of the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant. 
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter, 
the aopeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel, 
the Board of Review remands this matter to the ALJ to take new evidence as 
hereinafter set forth, pursuant to the provisions of Section 
35-4-lQ(d)(2)(C)(2)(a) of the rules of the Department which provide in 
pertinent part: 
The Board may also remand a matter for the taking of new 
evidence if, in the discretion of the Board, such 
evidence is of particularly significant importance that 
the Board determines its inclusion in the record is 
necessary for proper administration of the Act, 
In reviewing the testimony and other evidence of record in this 
case, the Board of Review is satisfied that the employer has followed the 
requirements of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Statute while testing the 
claimant for controlled substances (illegal drugs). The claimant has tested 
positive for the presence of controlled substances in his system on both 
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September 21st and November 25th of 1987. The claimant has admitted the use or 
marijuana prior to the first test on Septemoer 21, 1987 but has denied under 
oath that he used any marijuana between the test in Seotemoer and the test in 
Novemoer. He testified the test results were 1.23 on the Seotemoer test and 
.25 on the Novemoer test. He cites the difference in his test results as 
suooortive of his claim that he did not use marijuana between the two tests. 
He attributes the positive result on the Novemoer test to either being a 
residual of his usage of marijuana prior to the Seotemoer test or to passive 
inhalation as a result of the daily marijuana smoking of his two roommates in 
his presence. 
Neither the emoloyer nor the claimant presented exoert testimony 
regarding the drug test results, or the significance of the aoparent decrease 
from 1.23 to .25 in the test results as indicated by the claimant. Without 
expert testimony as to the meaning of the test results, the Board of Review is 
unable to determine whether the 65 days between the Septemoer test and the 
Novemoer test was sufficient time for the tested drug to clear the claimant's 
body, and if so, the possibilities of the claimant testing positive as a result 
of passive inhalation while in the same room with others who are smoking 
marijuana. 
The Board of Review therefore reauests the ALJ to reopen the hearing 
and call as an exoert witness Ellwood Loveridge, PhD, Director of Scientific 
Suoport Services for the Salt Lake County Health Department. Dr. Loveridge 
can be reached at phone numoer 534-4554. The notice of the reopened hearing 
should be sent to Dr. Loveridge as well as to the claimant and the emoloyer. 
Dr. Loveridge should be given the option of testifying in this matter by 
telephone. The claimant and the employer shall each be given the opoortunity 
to cross-examine Dr. Loveridge as to his interpretation of the drug test 
results and to offer additional expert testimony in rebuttal if they care to do 
so. The emoloyer is also requested to have the lab people who ran the tests in 
behalf of the employer availaole to testify as to their procedures and the test 
results of both the September and the Novemoer tests of the claimant so that 
Dr. Loveridge will be able to provide his interpretation of those test results 
for the record. At the close of the reopened hearing, the ALJ is requested to 
have the testimony transcribed and forwarded to the Board of Review for a final 
decision. 
B0AQJ3 OF REVIEW / 
Dated this 27th day of September, 1988. 
Date Mailed: October 14, 1988. /J? J ^ ^ ^ l ^ 
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1983 and mailed May 12, 
1983, the Board of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, David 
Bert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its 
decision on the grounds that he was never notified of the employer's appeal and 
was not given an oooortunity to sucmit written argument in favor of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to 
the claimant and was reversed by the 8oard of Review. Mr. Havas requested an 
opportunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration. 
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review. 
After receiving Mr. Havas7 memorandum in support of affirmance of the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant, the 
Board of Review remanded this case to the ALJ to take additional evidence. In 
the remand decision dated Seotember 27, 1988 and mailed October 14, 1938, the 
Board of Review requested that the additional testimony be transcribed and 
forwarded to the Board of Review for a final decision. The Board of Review has 
now received the additional evidence* 
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter, 
the appeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel, 
the Board of Review respectfully declines to reverse its decision dated May 10, 
1988 and mailed May 12, 1988. 
In declining to raversa its May 10, 1988 decision, the Board of 
Review makes the following additional comments and findings of fact based 
on the October 25, 1988 reopened hearing before the ALJ. 
The Board of Review notes that the claimant's attorney objected to 
Dr. Loveridge being accepted as an expert witness in this case on the grounds 
that Dr. Loveridge was not qualified as an analytical chemist dealing with the 
testing of marijuana in the human body and how long marijuana residue remains 
in the human body. After carefully considering Dr. Loveridge's answers to Mr. 
Havas' questions regarding his experience and expertise with respect to 
marijuana testing, the Board of Review sustains Mr. Havas' objections and 
therefore disregards Dr. Loveridge's testimony in this matter. 
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The employer called Dr. Kerr of its medical services unit as a 
witness in this matter. While Dr. Kerr acknowledged that he is not a 
specialist in the field of human toxicology, he testified that he did have 
knowledge about the length of time that marijuana residue or cannabinoids 
remains in the human body. 
Dr. Kerr testified that the claimant's first test on September 21st 
reported positive for 123 nanograms per milliliter for cannabinoids. The 
second test on November 25th again tested positive for cannabinoids at 25 
nanograms per milliliter. The required confirmation tests were run on the 
samples provided by the claimant on each of those dates. Dr. Kerr testified 
the thresnold or cutoff point on the preliminary screen test is 20 nanograms 
per milliliter and 5 nanograms per milliliter on the confirmation or* gas 
chromatography test. Therefore, the 25 nanograms per milliliter measured on 
the claimant's November 25th test breached the threshold for a positive test. 
Dr. Kerr acknowledged that the 25 nanograms per milliliter result of the 
claimant's November 25th test was significantly lower than the 128 nanograms 
per milliliter from the claimant's September 21st test. He acknowledged that 
he could not predict how long before the 25 nanogram level was found that the 
last exposure to marijuana occurred. He acknowledged that there is a prolonged 
time in which a test for cannabinoids will remain positive. He did not 
believe, however, that the test would remain positive on November 25th, 1987, 
if the claimant had not encountered further exposure to marijuana since 
September 21, 1987. Dr. Kerr also acknowledged that there is some evidence to 
indicate that extreme exposure to passive inhalation can cause a positive test 
result, such as three or four hours in a closed car or a small room with three 
to six people heavily smoking marijuana. He knew of no scientific studies that 
would indicate whether prolonged exposure such as experienced by the claimant 
living with other individuals who frequently used marijuana could result in a 
positive test. Dr. Kerr testified that marijuana can be detected in the body 
for several weeks after its use, but noted that by several weeks he meant four 
to six weeks. He stated he was not personally aware of any studies where 
positive tests resulted after a longer period of time. 
Dr. Kerr testified that follow-up tests of employees who have 
tested positive on a first test are not administered until at least six weeks 
have passed. He stated the six week period was arrived at on the 
recommendation of the Center for Human Toxicology at the University of Utah. 
The Center for Human Toxicology felt that anyone who wasn't continuing exposure 
to marijuana would test negative after six weeks-
Based on the testimony of Dr. Kerr, the Board of Review finds the 
testimony of the claimant wherein he denied continued use of marijuana after 
the September 21, 1987 test to not be credible. The Board of Review finds that 
if the claimant had discontinued the use of marijuana after the September 21, 
1987 test, he would have tested negative when tested again 65 days later on 
November 25, 1987. 
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In 1937, the Utah Stata Legislature passed a drug and alcohol 
testing statute with the following declared purpose and intent as found *n 
Section 34-33-1 of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act: 
34-38-1. Legislative findings - Purpose and intent of 
chapter. 
The Legislature finds that a healthy and 
productive work force, safe working conditions fr^e from the 
effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of the quality 
of products produced and services rendered in this state, 
are imoortant to emoloyers, emoloyees, and the general 
public. The Legislature further finds that the abuse of 
drugs and alcohol creates a variety of workplace problems, 
including increased -injuries on the job, increased 
absenteeism, increased financial burden on health and 
benefit programs, increased workplace theft, decreased 
employee morale, decreased productivity, and a decline in 
the quality of products and services. 
Therefore, in balancing the interests of 
emoloyers, employees, and the welfare of the general public, 
the Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for 
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this 
chapter, is in the best interest of all parties. 
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any 
employee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if 
action was taken by his employer based on a false drug or 
alcohol test result. 
The Board of Review finds the employer's alcohol and drug policy to 
be consistent with and in compliance with the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing 
Act. On the other hand, by his own admissions in this record, the claimant 
appears to have violated Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, which provides: 
58-37-3. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to be present where controlled substances are being 
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the 
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence 
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snows that he did not use tne substance himself or 
aavisa, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any 
incidence of prior unlawful use of control lea suo-
stances by tne aefendant may be aamittaa to reout tnis 
defense; . . . 
Although the claimant contends he diet use marijuana after the 
first test on Septemoer 21, 1937, tne positive results of tne second test 
on Novemoer 25, 1937, together with his admission that he concinuea to live 
with two roommates wno consumea marijuana in his presence every day ana 
that he was thus exoosed to marijuana smoke three or four times a nignt, 
leaas tne Soara of Review to a conclusion that the claimant's denial of 
marijuana use following tne Septemoer test is not creaiole. The claimant 
has acmitted using marijuana prior to tne Septemoer test. The Soara of 
Review is not convinced tnat the claimant discontinued his personal use 
of marijuana after tne Septemoer test where he continuea to* live in an 
environment wnere marijuana was usea three or four times a nignt on a daily 
basis by the claimant's roommates* The Novemoer test results indicate 
otherwise. There is nothing in the record of this case to convince the 
Board of Review that passive inhalation, under the circumstances described 
by tne claimant, wnicn appears to violate the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, as notea aoove, is any less culpaole or harmful in its effect than 
direct innalation of marijuana smoke. 
The Board of Review therefore declines to undermine the laudible 
objectives of the Utah Drug and Alconol Testing Act, the Utah Controlled 
Suostances Act, and this employer's drug and alcohol policies by allowing 
unemployment insurance benefits to one wno has lost his employment througn 
a willful violation of his employer's drug and alconol policy. 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be suomitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah. To file an 
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court 
a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for apoeal, pursuant 
to §§53-45b-lo of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
Dated this 30th day of Decamoer, 1988. 
Data Mailed: December 8, 1988. 
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